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THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED




In a constitutional democracy citizens normally have a sense of the
kinds of reasons that are fittingly appealed to, as well as those that are
not, in legislative and judicial forums and when arguing about laws
and the constitution with people who hold different religious or
philosophical views. We see this all the time in arguments in news
editorials, for example. But it is very hard to characterize these
reasons in any straightforward way. It is not enough to say that,
because people have different faiths and their differences are
irresolvable, religious considerations ought to be kept out of politics.
For people have irresolvably conflicting philosophical and ethical
beliefs too. Moreover, sometimes it may be wholly fitting within
public political life for members of a faith to declare the religious
beliefs that lead them to support or oppose measures involving
fundamental questions of justice (Martin Luther King's religious
declarations in support of civil rights is one example). How then are
we to make sense of this idea of "public reasons"?
John Rawls takes the rather inchoate idea of public reason and
explicates it, characteristically, in a complicated way. For example:
-Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people; it is the
reason of equal citizens.
-Public reason's subject is the good of the public; its content is a
political conception of justice.
-Public reason's constraints apply in the "public political forum,"
not in the "background culture."
-Public reason is "complete": It is capable of providing reasonable
answers to questions involving constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice.
-Public reason aims for public justification and is reasoning
* Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful for
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addressed to others in their capacity as reasonable democratic
citizens.
-Public reason and public justification meet the "criterion of
reciprocity"; they proceed from reasons or premises we reasonably
think others could reasonably accept to conclusions they also could
reasonably accept.
-When government officials act from public reason, legal
enactments by a majority are politically legitimate, even when they
are not fully just.
Given the complexity of Rawls's account, the idea of public reason
and the related ideas of political legitimacy and public and political
justification are easily, and often, misunderstood. I hope to shed some
light on what Rawls means by these key ideas in political liberalism.
In the first three Parts (1-111) of the paper, I discuss the background to
Rawls's idea of public reason and how public reason is closely bound
up with conceptions of democratic citizens and democratic
institutions. Then in Parts IV-V, I discuss how public reason is
integrally related to other central ideas, including political
reasonableness and political legitimacy, and public and political
justifications. Here, to help clarify these ideas, I address some
powerful criticisms of them by Joseph Raz. In Part VI, I discuss the
completeness of public reason and address the frequent argument to
the contrary, that appeals to comprehensive reasons are unavoidable
to resolve many constitutional disputes. I discuss two versions of this
objection, by Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann on the one hand,
and Ronald Dworkin on the other. In Part VII, I discuss Rawls's
claim that the supreme court is the exemplar of public reason, and
compare public reason with Cass Sunstein's account of "Incompletely
Theorized Agreements." The paper concludes with some reflections
on the evolution of Rawls's idea of a well-ordered society.
I. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
Few moral philosophers have devoted as much effort and
painstaking detail as Rawls to working out the nature of moral
justification. Rawls began his career writing, not on justice, but on
justification in moral philosophy. His first article, Outline of a
Decision Procedure for Ethics, deriving from his doctoral dissertation,
provided the basis for his later account of reflective equilibrium.1 In
that work Rawls sets forth a four-part test for "the reasonableness of
moral principles." The first part says that moral principles are to be a
1. John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics (1951), reprinted in
John Rawls: Collected Papers 1 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). "[T]he aim of the
present inquiry, [is] namely, to describe a decision procedure whereby principles, by
means of which we may justify specific moral decisions, may themselves be shown to
be justifiable. Now part of this procedure will consist in showing that these principles
are implicit in the considered judgments of competent judges." Id. at 6.
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"comprehensive explication of the considered judgments of
competent judges."2 In the second and third parts of Rawls's test, his
contractarianism becomes evident, though not yet explicitly referred
to in those terms. The second test says reasonable principles are those
that "show[] a capacity to become accepted by competent moral
judges" after criticism and open discussion, and which "exhibit a
capacity to win free and willing allegiance and be able to implement a
gradual convergence of uncoerced opinion. '3 "Thirdly," Rawls says,
the reasonableness of a principle is tested by seeing whether it can
function in existing instances of conflicting opinion, and in new cases
causing difficulty, to yield a result which, after criticism and
discussion, seems to be acceptable to all, or nearly all, competent
judges, and to conform to their intuitive notion of a reasonable
decision.4
Here it is evident that Rawls from the beginning conceived of
justification in moral philosophy as establishing the reasonableness of
moral principles. For Rawls, reasonableness stands in for the notion
of truth in moral philosophy. Now the idea that reasonable moral
principles are those that are generally acceptable to conscientious,
informed, and morally motivated moral agents resurfaces in A Theory
of Justice. It is found, not directly in the agreement in the original
position, but in Rawls's account of moral persons and a well-ordered
society. A condition upon rational parties' agreement in the original
position is that the principles of justice be publicly knowable and
generally acceptable among free and equal moral persons with a sense
of justice in a well-ordered society regulated by those principles.'
The publicity condition implicit in Rawls's account of a well-
ordered society suggests that he was concerned with an idea of public
justification prior to explicitly appealing to that idea.6 The publicity
condition in A Theory of Justice implies that principles of justice are
reasonable only if they are generally acceptable to the members of a
well-ordered society and could serve as a basis for public justification
for them in resolving issues and disputes about justice. One of
Rawls's primary arguments against utilitarianism is that the principle
of utility could not serve as a basis for public justification in a well-
ordered society that remains stable, whereas the principles of justice
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 10-11.
4. Id. at 11.
5. The parties in the original position choose principles for a "well-ordered
society," which Rawis defines as an ideal society where everyone accepts the same
principles of justice and basic social institutions are publicly known to satisfy these
principles. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 1, at 4-5, § 78, at 453-54 (rev. ed. 1999);
see id. § 23, at 113 n.5 (on the publicity condition).
6. The first explicit appeal to the role of principles in public justification comes in
the 1980 Dewey Lectures, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Philosophy (1980),
reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers 303, 327-56 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
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are ideally suited to play this role because of their emphasis on
reciprocity.7 Still, however much the idea of publicity and even public
justification might have guided Rawls's arguments for the principles of
justice up to and including A Theory of Justice, and afterwards in the
1980 Dewey Lectures, it is not until Political Liberalism that we find a
need for the distinct idea of public reason.'
The idea of public reason initially was designed to deal with a gap in
Rawls's theory of justice, which arose after he discerned problems
with the account of the stability of a well-ordered society, as depicted
in A Theory of Justice. That account relied on the assumption that
everyone in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness would find it
rational to develop and exercise their capacities for justice in order to
achieve the good of social union and realize their nature as free and
equal autonomous moral beings. What made this argument for the
"congruence of the right and the good"9 work (in so far as it did) was
an assumption that the great majority of people in a well-ordered
society would find it rational to affirm their (purported) nature as free
rational beings by endorsing the Kantian ideal of moral autonomy as
an intrinsic good. In order to achieve the good of autonomy, agents
must incorporate into their life-plans a highest-order virtue to act for
the sake of justice, which enables them to realize their moral
capacities for justice and thereby achieve moral autonomy.10 For our
purposes the important point in Rawls's complicated argument for the
congruence of the right and the good is that, if it were true that the
stability of a well-ordered society depended on such a congruence,
then reasons of moral autonomy, self-realization of moral and rational
capacities, and related Kantian ideas would serve as fundamental
justifying reasons in making and interpreting laws, and more generally
in public justification in a well-ordered society.
To see why, consider what is needed to apply abstract principles of
justice to decide on laws and to interpret and enforce their
implications in particular cases. For example, what kinds of
considerations are relevant to deciding the scope and limits of the
basic liberties in Rawls's first principle, such as freedom of the person
and freedom of association? What kinds of constitutional rights do
these abstract liberties require? Do they imply a general right of
privacy that protects a right of abortion and a right to same-sex
relations? People with different religious and philosophical views
disagree about this. But in A Theory of Justice Rawls envisioned
political recourse to the values of moral and rational autonomy to
decide such questions. In Rawls's first principle of justice, as stated in
A Theory of Justice, basic liberties can only be limited for the sake of a
7. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 29.
8. See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
9. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 79, at 456.
10. See id. § 86.
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more extensive system of basic liberties." One reason for the priority
given to maximal basic liberty is that the most extensive scheme of
basic liberties is needed to realize the moral and rational autonomy of
free and equal moral persons.12 Following A Theory of Justice, public
recourse to these kinds of reasons is perfectly appropriate, if not
necessary, to interpret the constitution in a society governed by
Rawls's principles of justice.
The problem Rawls subsequently discovered with official political
appeals to autonomy are familiar. The value of autonomy is part of
one or more "comprehensive doctrines" which (because of certain
"burdens of judgment") could not be generally endorsed by
conscientious moral agents, even in a well-ordered society where
Rawls's own principles of justice are generally accepted. To justify
application of the principles of justice by appealing to this and other
Kantian or Millian values is to appeal to moral values which some
conscientious citizens (liberal Catholics for example) explicitly reject.
Now for many political and legal theorists, there is no genuine
problem here. They will say that liberalism, if it did not originate with
the idea of autonomy, receives its most robust and securest defense
when grounded in the value of moral and rational autonomy (as in
Kant, Mill, or Rawls himself). If so, then these values should be made
part of public political culture and education if liberalism is to be best
secured against its potential adversaries.
Rawls gradually came to think that this position-namely, enforcing
a generally accepted public conception of justice under the auspices of
a philosophical doctrine that many reasonable citizens reject-borders
on a violation of liberty of conscience. For even if that philosophical
doctrine were true, still to enforce it politically differs little from the
political enforcement of a religious faith from the point of view of
11. In A Theory of Justice the first principle says: "Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all." The first principle's priority rule says a basic liberty
can be restricted only for the sake of protecting others' basic liberty. Rawls, A Theory
of Justice, supra note 5, § 39, at 220. In The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,
(lecture VIII of Political Liberalism) Rawls restates the first principle in response to
H.L.A. Hart's objection that the idea of maximal liberty is problematic. In response,
Rawls substituted "fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties" for "most extensive
total system" of equal basic liberties, and tied the interpretation of the "fully
adequate scheme" to a conception of free and equal moral persons with two moral
powers. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 291.
12. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 82. Notice that in both
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003), the Supreme Court relied on the values of "personal dignity and
autonomy" to reaffirm a woman's right to abortion (in Casey) and the protection of
same-sex relations (in Lawrence). The personal autonomy referred to in these cases
seems to be simply individual liberty. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. As such, it should
not be understood as the kind of positive freedom that Kant, J.S. Mill, Rawls, and
others intend under the name of "autonomy" (or alternatively, "individuality") and
which serves for them as a comprehensive conception of the human good.
2004] 2025
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reasonable and rational citizens rejecting that doctrine. A well-
ordered society's generally accepted conception of justice relies on
comprehensive reasons and values which many reasonable and
rational citizens still reject. These comprehensive reasons are
politically endorsed since they are officially consulted by legislatures
and the courts to determine the application of principles of justice to
the constitution. For Rawls, any conception of justice (including
justice as fairness) endorsed under these conditions no longer
provides a public basis for justification, even though all reasonable
people accept the principles embodied in that very conception and it is
politically embodied in laws.
Rawls developed political liberalism to alleviate these problems. Its
main ideas include (1) the ideas of the domain of the political and a
political conception of justice, (2) the idea of an overlapping
consensus, and (3) the idea of public reason. As Rawls describes it, a
political conception of justice differs from a moral conception of
justice (such as that offered in A Theory of Justice) in that it is
"freestanding" from comprehensive views and is worked up from
fundamental ideas implicit in democratic culture and shared by
reasonable citizens.13 Because it is freestanding and its fundamental
ideas are widely shared, Rawls conjectures that a political conception
should be able to generate (in a well-ordered society) an overlapping
consensus on its principles and basic ideas among different reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, each of which then endorse it for their own
particular reasons. Finally a political conception that is widely
affirmed in an overlapping consensus of reasonable views provides
needed content to public reason; it thereby legitimates the laws and
serves as a basis for public justification among people with differing
moral and religious views. This litany roughly describes the
relationships among Rawls's key ideas in political liberalism. Now I'll
say something more to clarify the idea of public reason.
Rawls contrasts public reasons with both non-public and
comprehensive reasons. Public reason (as Rawls understands the
idea) involves a set of shared considerations which count as good
reasons in public deliberation and argument about laws and their
interpretation, among reasonable and rational democratic citizens
who endorse different fundamental values. Because of liberty of
conscience and other basic liberties, citizens in a democratic society
are inevitably going to have, not just different values or conceptions of
their good, but also different religious, philosophical and ethical
views. (This is the fact of reasonable pluralism.) It is because
reasonable doctrines disagree about basic values and reasons that
there is (for Rawls) a need for the idea of public reason-public




reason presupposes reasonable pluralism. 4 In A Theory of Justice
there was no need for an account of (public) reasons that was any
different from the reasons that accompanied the Kantian
interpretation of justice as fairness. For everybody in a well-ordered
society already accepted the comprehensive reasons provided by a
Kantian view. But given reasonable pluralism, there is no longer a
shared set of comprehensive reasons and guidelines for reasoning that
all can appeal to in applying principles of justice. Public reason aims
to delineate such a shared set of considerations that are not peculiar
to any comprehensive view, but which can be accepted by all
reasonable views in so far as they accommodate democratic ideals.
For Rawls public reasons are part of the "domain of the political."
The moral ideal of free and equal autonomous moral persons cannot
provide a basis for public justification in a well-ordered democracy (as
Rawls had hoped in A Theory of Justice); however, the political ideal
of free and equal democratic citizens can serve this public role
because this political ideal can be endorsed by different reasonable
comprehensive views (so Rawls contends). 5
Rawls says "[p]ublic reason is characteristic of a democratic people:
it is the reason of its citizens [as such], of those sharing the status of
equal citizenship."' 6 This suggests that the mere fact that people in a
society commonly accept and reason in terms of some common
religion or other comprehensive doctrine does not make that doctrine
part of public reason. Even assuming that all the members of an
Islamic state, such as Saudi Arabia, accept the Muslim religion and
appeal to religious reasons in deliberating and discussing laws, this
does not make Islam part of public reason. Saudi Arabia has no
public reason in Rawls's sense, only shared comprehensive reasons
the nature of which rule out the possibility of a public reason.
In his earlier presentation of the idea of public reason Rawls
introduces public reason as part of justice as fairness. He
distinguishes two kinds of liberal political values: first, "the values of
political justice-fall under the principles of justice for the basic
structure"; and second, "the values of public reason-fall under the
guidelines for public inquiry, which make that inquiry free and
public."' 7 The values of public reason are among the guidelines for
applying the principles of justice that presumably all reasonable
persons accept in a well-ordered society. If we assume different
comprehensive conceptions in a well-ordered society, then even
14. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), reprinted in John
Rawls: Collected Papers 573, 573-74 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
15. Id. at 586.
16. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 213; see also Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 577 ("The idea of public reason arises from
a conception of democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy.").
17. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 224.
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though everyone accepts the same principles of justice, they will apply
the principles of justice differently because they have different
comprehensive views. For standards of evidence, inference, good
reasons, and judgment differ among comprehensive views. As a result
there is a need in a well-ordered society for standards of inquiry and
reasoning that will allow people holding different comprehensive
views to come to the same conclusions in applying the public
conception of justice. So Rawls depicts the parties in the original
position as agreeing, in addition to principles of justice, to "guidelines
of public reason" for applying these principles."i
But Rawls also has another route to the idea of public reason, one
that is not tied specifically to justice as fairness. Here Rawls
introduces the idea of public reason by way of a requirement of liberal
legitimacy.19 Liberal legitimacy imposes a moral duty of civility on
citizens: a duty "to be able to explain to one another on those
fundamental questions [regarding constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice] how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of public
reason."2 Legitimacy is not an idea that plays any explicit role in A
Theory of Justice. Again, like public reason, the need for it arose
largely as a result of the same problems implicit in A Theory of
Justice's argument for stability. Even if everyone endorses the same
conception of justice, and this conception (justice as fairness, let us
assume) were the most reasonable, still it would not be legitimate to
make and enforce laws under it for reasons (such as autonomy) that
cannot be reasonably endorsed by other reasonable comprehensive
views. Rawls indicates that this conception of legitimacy, like public
reason, is necessary "if each citizen [is to have] an equal share in
18. "In justice as fairness, then, the guidelines of public reason and the principles
of justice have essentially the same grounds. They are companion parts of one
agreement." Id. at 225-26.
19. Id. at 217. The liberal principle of legitimacy says:
[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and
ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.
Id. For Rawls's initial statement of the principle, see id. at 137; a later statement is in
Reply to Habermas, id. at 393; and Rawls's final statement of the principle in his 1997
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers 578
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). See also the earlier statement of the principle in Rawls's
Harvard lecture notes, John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 41, 84, 90-91,
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001). For a discussion of how political legitimacy is related to but
differs from justice, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 427-29.
20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 217. A duty of civility is in A
Theory of Justice, but is stated differently: it "imposes a due acceptance of the defects
of [just] institutions and a certain restraint in taking advantage of them." Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 53, at 312. Rawls appealed to this duty to argue for




political power."" Moreover, as suggested, liberty of conscience is at
issue, since for Rawls there is no genuine difference between
government officials deciding on and enforcing a law or decree that is
purely for reasons of autonomy and their deciding on and enforcing
the same law or decree purely for religious reasons (because it is
compatible with God's commands as expressed in natural law). Both
cases are not legitimate exercises of political authority, even though
the laws concerned may be substantively just.
Another use Rawls makes of the idea of legitimacy is to deal with
the problem of the status of duly enacted laws that are not wholly just
or reasonable. Even the most conscientious legislators who apply a
just constitution and follow just democratic procedures can make laws
with unjust results. Rawls contends that these laws are still legitimate,
even if not wholly just or reasonable, in so far as they meet the liberal
principle of legitimacy. Provided duly enacted laws do not exceed
certain limits of injustice and meet the legitimacy principle,
democratic citizens normally have a duty to obey them.2"
II. THE CONTENT OF PUBLIC REASON
The idea of public reason presupposes a diversity of conflicting
reasonable comprehensive views, and it excludes reasons that are
peculiar to one or another view (autonomy, aggregate utility, the will
of God and natural law, etc.). But public reason is something more
than simply the reasons and standards of judgment that reasonable
comprehensive views all hold in common (an important point
returned to later). What then is the nature and content of public
reason? For Rawls public reason is the "reason of [democratic]
citizens as such."23 By "as such" he means that it is the reason of
democratic citizens in their capacity as citizens, and not in any other
status or position they occupy (as parent, or a member of a particular
profession or religion, for example). Public reasoning implies the
adoption of a general standpoint, one where people abstract from
their ordinary perspectives guided by their particular interests and
comprehensive views and take up the point of view of a democratic
citizen. From this point of view one is to focus on the reasons and
21. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 19, at 90.
22. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 393, 427-29. "It is
unreasonable to expect in general that human statutes and laws should be strictly just
by our lights." Id. at 393 n.30; see also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 53,
at 312; Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 578. Another
clear need for an idea of legitimacy is in the case of just laws that are not duly
enacted, but which are enforced by fiat. Universal health care is for Rawls a
requirement of justice, but it would not be legitimate for an executive body to put
such a system into effect by decree if it had been democratically rejected. As Rawls
says, "being legitimate says something about [laws' or governments'] pedigree."
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 427.
23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 213.
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interests of free and equal democratic citizens and what they require
in order to function in their role as citizens and to freely pursue a
conception of their good.
This leads us to the second aspect of public reason, namely its
proper subject. The subject of public reason is the good of the public
and matters of fundamental justice. The good of the public and
matters of fundamental justice are what democratic citizens are to
reason about when engaged in public reasoning-not their own
particular good, or that of some group they identify with, or even
justice or the good as determined by a comprehensive doctrine. How
do we know the good of the public? For Rawls it appears to be
defined in terms of the political values needed to realize the common
interests that. democratic citizens share-again, in their capacity as
citizens. Democratic citizens have certain fundamental interests,
which provide them with reasons as citizens and in turn supply a basis
for public reason. On Rawls's political conception of free and equal
moral persons, democratic citizens have "higher-order interests" in
the exercise and development of the "moral powers" that enable them
to cooperate and take part in social life and rationally pursue a
conception of their good, as well as interests in establishing conditions
needed to secure and maintain their freedom and equality.24 They
also have a higher-order interest in social and political conditions that
enable them to freely pursue reasonable conceptions of the good.
These fundamental interests of democratic citizens provide the
ultimate basis for public reasoning about fundamental justice and the
common good. What are the political values and the measures
needed to enable democratic citizens to realize their capacities for
justice and rationality? What measures enable citizens to freely and
fairly pursue their conceptions of the good? What duties and
obligations to one another and to the public should citizens have if
they are to achieve the common good? These are the kinds of
questions that ultimately regulate public reason."
24. The two moral powers are (1) the capacity for a sense of justice, to
understand, apply, and act from the public conception of justice; and (2) the capacity
for a conception of the good, to form, revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of
one's rational advantage or good. Id. at 19, 81, 103-04. Rawls refers to these
respectively as the powers to be reasonable and rational.
25. Regarding the political values, Rawls says, "These values provide public
reasons for all citizens." Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at
601. Among the liberal political values Rawls mentions are such values of justice as
equal political and civil liberty, equality of opportunity, social equality and economic
reciprocity, the common good, the social bases of self-respect, and the necessary
conditions for these values. There are also the political values of public reason,
including guidelines for free and public inquiry, the appropriate use of concepts of
judgment, inference and evidence, and such political virtues as reasonableness, fair-
mindedness, and a readiness to honor the duty of civility, all of which make reasoned
public discussion possible. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 139, 224.
Later Rawls says that the values mentioned in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution
are examples of political values: a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility,
2030 [Vol. 72
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Third, public reason is guided by a criterion of reciprocity. "[T]he
criterion of reciprocity is an essential ingredient specifying public
reason and its content .... "26 To give public reasons is to give reasons
that we can reasonably expect that others can reasonably accept as
democratic citizens, in view of their fundamental interests in
maintaining the conditions of their freedom and equality.27 I discuss
the idea of reasonableness further infra, in Part IV. Here the main
point is that this idea is to be interpreted in this context in terms of an
ideal of free and equal citizens. For this reason Rawls frequently
refers to the "politically reasonable."
Fourth, the content of public reason, Rawls says, is "given by the
ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political
justice. '28 Or, as Rawls says in later discussions, "the content of public
reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not
by a single one. "29 To engage fully in public reason is to deliberate
within the framework of a political conception when debating
fundamental political questions, each of which satisfies the criterion of
reciprocity.30 Here Rawls clearly indicates that public reasoning
involves more than simply appealing to political values that
democratic citizens hold in common. It also requires interpreting
democratic political values according to the principles and ideas of a
the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty for ourselves
and our posterity, all of which include more specific values under them, such as the
fair distribution of income and wealth. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
supra note 14, at 584. Efficiency and effectiveness are political values, which would
include controlling economic, environmental and other kinds of social loss or waste.
Id. Political values that relate to human health, the environment, and so on that
Rawls mentions are: preserving the natural order to further the good of ourselves and
future generations; promoting biological and medical knowledge by fostering species
of animals and plants; and protecting the beauties of nature for purposes of public
recreation and "the pleasures of a deeper understanding of the world." Rawls,
Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 245. From his brief discussions of abortion we
learn that among the political values are: appropriate respect for human life, the
reproduction of liberal society over time, full equality of women, and respecting the
requirements of public reason itself in political discussion of controversial issues (such
as abortion). See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 19, at 117. Political values that
relate to the family are: the freedom and equality of women, the equality of children
as future citizens, the freedom of religion, and the value of the family in securing the
orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to
the next. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 601.
26. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 609.
27. Cf. id. at 578.
28. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 213.
29. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 581.
30. See id.
A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within a
framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable
political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values
that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected
reasonably to endorse.
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political conception of justice, and not according to anyone's
comprehensive view. The need for political conceptions to give
content to public reason arises because, in the absence of a political
conception of justice, public reason is incomplete-it is without
sufficient content to resolve many of the political questions of justice
encountered in democratic political life. The incompleteness of public
reason means citizens and officials have to rely upon some
comprehensive doctrine to make or interpret laws. For Rawls, this
deprives laws of their legitimacy, since they no longer have a political
justification. Why a lack of public justification should matter will be
discussed further, in Part VI.31
Fifth, because public reason limits itself to considerations that
reasonable citizens can reasonably accept in their capacity as
democratic citizens, public reason does not aim to state the "whole
truth" about metaphysics, morality, or ultimate values. There are
many good and true reasons that are not a part of public reason, but
which belong to comprehensive views. Rawls first used the term
"public reason" just to make the point that the aim of public
justification as reasonable agreement on a political conception cannot
be achieved in a democracy if a conception is based in the whole
"truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order." For
most, if not all, reasonable comprehensive doctrines endorsed by
reasonable citizens contain at least some false judgments about
metaphysical and moral issues. As a result, reasonable agreement
among persons endorsing different doctrines can never be achieved on
the basis of the whole truth. Rather than the whole truth, public
justification is "founded on public agreement in judgment on due
reflection. The aim is free agreement, reconciliation through public
reason."32 Rawls's position gives rise to the objection (by Joseph Raz)
that, in eschewing the whole truth, a public justification of a political
conception might end up "publicly justifying" false principles on the
basis of false beliefs. This objection is to be considered in Part V
infra. As we will see, in response Rawls argues that, in eschewing the
whole truth, public reason does not eschew objectivity of judgment,
and indeed that reasonable judgments in political conceptions do not
conflict with true judgments in reasonable comprehensive doctrines
that endorse these political conceptions.33
31. Cf Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 247.
32. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985), reprinted in
John Rawls: Collected Papers 388, 395 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls adds:
"Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral
order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception
of justice in a democratic society." Id.
33. See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 609.
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III. THE INSTITUTIONS OF PUBLIC REASON
Like many of his key ideas, the idea of public reason takes on
increasing complexity each time Rawls discusses it. In his later works
Rawls comes to envision a background of institutions required by
public reason if its ideal is to be realized. In the 1996 Introduction to
the paperback edition of Political Liberalism,34 then again in the Law
of Peoples,35 Rawls discusses what is held in common by the political
conceptions that provide content to public reason. They are all liberal
conceptions in so far as they, first, guarantee certain familiar basic
rights, liberties and opportunities; second, they assign priority to these
basic rights, liberties and opportunities over other social and political
values; and third, they insure measures providing all citizens, whatever
their social position, adequate all-purpose means to make effective
use of their basic liberties and opportunities.3 6 From prior discussions
one might infer that by this third condition, what Rawls intended was
simply a social minimum, i.e., income supports for the less
advantaged, which might be decided in a number of ways in addition
to Rawls's difference principle. But Rawls here goes on to say that, in
order for a liberal political conception to satisfy the third condition it
must (as a matter of "common sense political sociology") allow for
five kinds of institutions: (1) public financing of political campaigns
and ways of assuring the availability of information on matters of
public policy, to prevent the distortion or manipulation of public
reasoning; (2) "[a] certain fair equality of opportunity" especially in
education and training; (3) a decent distribution of income and
wealth; (4) society as an employer of last resort, needed in order to
provide security and meaningful work, so citizens can maintain their
self-respect; and (5) "[b]asic health care assured all citizens."37
Any political conception is unreasonable for Rawls unless it meets
these conditions. It is unreasonable since, in the absence of these
conditions, a political conception cannot meet the criterion of
reciprocity. It cannot reasonably or sincerely be thought that other
democratic citizens could reasonably accept the absence of effective
34. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at xxxvii-lxii.
35. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999).
36. Cf id. at 49; Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at xlviii. From The Idea
of an Overlapping Consensus and Political Liberalism, I think it is apparent that
Rawls saw all liberal political conceptions as protecting basically the same set of
abstract basic liberties that he says are protected by his first principle of justice:
namely, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of association and
equal political liberties, the freedom specified by the liberty and integrity of the
person, and the rights and liberties covered by the ideal of the rule of law. See John
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus (1987), reprinted in John Rawls:
Collected Papers 421, 440 n.27 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 8, at 6, 291-94. Since these liberties, along with equal
opportunities and adequate all-purpose means, can be understood in different ways,
Rawls says there are many liberalisms. Id. at 6.
37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at lviii-lix.
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means to exercise the basic liberties as a basis for cooperation. Thus
Rawls says, libertarianism is unreasonable since it does not try to meet
these conditions, but indeed explicitly rejects them.38
Now, it comes as some surprise when Rawls goes on to suggest that
these same institutions are required by, or are a precondition for,
public reason. These institutions are, he says,
essential prerequisites for a basic structure within which the ideal of
public reason, when conscientiously followed by citizens, may
protect the basic liberties and prevent social and economic
inequalities from being excessive. Since the ideal of public reason
contains a form of public political deliberation, these institutions,
most clearly the first three, are necessary for this deliberation to be
possible and fruitful. A belief in the importance of public
deliberation is essential for a reasonable constitutional regime, and
specific institutions and arrangements need to be laid down to
support and encourage it. The idea of public reason proposes how
to characterize the structure and content of society's fundamental
bases for political deliberations.39
Here Rawls suggests that the ideal, if not the idea, of public reason
requires as background conditions not only a decent social minimum,
but also the institutions of a deliberative democracy if that ideal is to
be realized in political life. The distinction between the idea and the
ideal of public reason may be important here. Rawls is not saying that
a democracy cannot be governed by public reasons to any degree
unless it guarantees all these background institutions. But it is clear
that he thinks something essential to public reasoning is missing in the
absence of a deliberative democracy and its background conditions.
Public reason is the mode of discourse in a deliberative democracy
and one of its most essential features.4 °  Moreover, deliberative
democracy is the primary forum within which public reasoning takes
place. Citizens in a democracy cannot effectively engage in public
reasoning (1) if they or some of their members' basic needs are not
adequately provided for, to the degree that they cannot take effective
and intelligent advantage of their basic freedoms; (2) if the political
forum and the free flow of public information is corrupted by monied
interests or by other concentrations of power; and (3) if there are not
widespread fair opportunities for education, job training, and
participation in public life. "Otherwise all parts of society cannot take
part in the debates of public reason or contribute to social and
economic policies."41
38. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 35, at 49.
39. Id. at lix-lx (emphasis added); see also id. at 50-51.
40. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 580.
41. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 35, at 50. For the relationship between
public reason and deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and
Democratic Legitimacy, in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17, 21,
24 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Petit eds., 1989); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in
2034 [Vol. 72
PUBLIC REASONS
IV. PUBLIC REASON AND POLITICAL REASONABLENESS
What kinds of considerations are to be expressed in public reason
and count as public reasons?42 The public reasons that are to be
expressed in public reason are considerations regarding political
values that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. In public reasoning, we
are to present, as justifications for laws and policies, "reasons we
might reasonably expect that [citizens] as free and equal might
reasonably also accept.
43
The idea of reasonableness plays a major role in this criterion, and
thus in understanding the idea of public reason. What does it mean?
Throughout his career Rawls used the idea of reasonable-or "the
Reasonable"-in a number of ways. At some point or another he
refers to "reasonable acceptance," "reasonable political conceptions,"
"reasonable principles," "reasonable claims," "reasonable persons,"
"reasonable comprehensive doctrines," "reasonable conditions on
agreement," and "politically reasonable." In all instances he refuses
to offer a definition of "reasonable" in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Many express frustration at this, and say the
idea of reasonableness only masks appeals to inchoate intuition.4 But
any attempt to provide a definition of 'reasonable' would be incapable
of capturing all that is involved in the many uses of this rich concept.
Moreover, like most definitions of important concepts, the terms used
in the definiens normally are in need of definition as much or more
than the terms defined, initiating a process with no end in sight. In
this regard, attempts to provide fixed and unrevisable definitions of
"reasonableness" prove fruitless. What can be provided are
clarifications, by focusing on important features of the idea of
reasonableness as it is used in different contexts, in hopes that this will
help explicate the concept. In many regards, Rawls's moral and
political philosophy is such an attempt to explicate the meaning and
import of moral reasonableness-what reasonable principles of justice
are, what it is to be a reasonable person, and so on. Rawls
Deliberative Democracy 185 (Jon Elster ed., 1998); Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic
Society, in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 86 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
42. While Rawls normally discusses "public reason" he occasionally refers to the
plural, "public reasons." On at least two occasions he uses the singular and the plural
in the same sentence: (1) "[R]easonable [comprehensive] doctrines may be
introduced in public reason at any time, given that in due course public reasons,
provided by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support." Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 8, at li-lii; (2) "However, it [public reason] does not, as such,
determine or settle particular questions of law or policy. Rather, it specifies the
public reasons in terms of which such questions are to be politically decided." Id. at
liii.
43. Id. at li; cf Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 578.
44. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Feminist Contractarianism, in A Mind of One's Own:
Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity 227, 249 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte
Witt eds., 1993).
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provisionally characterizes a reasonable person as one who has a
willingness to cooperate on fair terms, recognizes and appreciates the
consequences of the "burdens of judgment," and has a sense of justice.
He aims to show that a reasonable person in the end is one who
affirms his principles of justice. Principles of justice that are (most)
reasonable for free and equal citizens are those that would be agreed
to by representatives of reasonable persons in the original position
and which fit with our fixed and considered moral convictions in
reflective equilibrium.45 Of course these are not definitions (which for
Rawls are always provisional46) but substantive claims about
reasonable principles and persons.
Rawls then explicates the idea of reasonable principles by way of
the related idea of reasonable persons:47 Reasonable principles of
justice are those that reasonable persons or their representatives
would endorse from a perspective that is fair between them (the
original position on Rawls's account). What especially warrants
mentioning here is that the idea of reasonableness and reasonable
persons implies being responsive not just to the reasons others have
but also to the reasons they think they have. The idea of
reasonableness assumes that people often will act for reasons that are
not valid or true (as determined by science or by the true
comprehensive doctrine, if there is one). Many reasonable people
have religious convictions that they believe provide them with reasons
for acting and ordering their lives.48 Since conflicting religions (and
45. "The overall criterion of the reasonable is general and wide reflective
equilibrium," which "is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get
closer to it." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 384-85. What makes
reflective equilibrium on principles of justice "general" is that principles are in "full"
reflective equilibrium for each reasonable and rational citizen-"full" in so far as
these principles are endorsed by and incorporated into their respective reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. Id. See infra Part V.D. for a discussion of "full
justification," and Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 386-87.
46. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 10, at 44.
47. Cf. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 94. Reasonable persons have
the following four features: They want to cooperate with others on terms that are fair
and are willing to propose and honor such terms; they recognize and accept the
consequences of the burdens of judgment; they both want to be, and to be recognized
as, fully cooperative and fairminded; they have a "reasonable moral psychology,"
including a sense of justice, and thus want to do what is right and just for its own sake.
Id. at 81-82. Each of these features of reasonable persons can be further clarified: for
example we can assume that reasonable persons respect others and are sensitive to
the reasons they have. They "take into account the consequences of their actions on
others' well-being." Id. at 49 n.1. They don't exploit others or take advantage of them
whenever the opportunity arises, and so on.
48. Steven Pinker says:
The Judeo-Christian conception is still the most popular theory of human
nature in the United States. According to recent polls, 76 percent of
Americans believe in the biblical account of creation, 79 percent believe that
the miracles in the Bible actually took place, 76 percent believe in angels, the
devil, and other immaterial souls, 67 percent believe they will exist in some
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more generally, conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines)
cannot all be true, most, if not all contain reasons that are false or
which are based on false beliefs about the world. Still, Rawls claims it
would be unreasonable to ignore or not be sensitive to these reasons,
or not normally accept or tolerate people's affirming and acting on the
particular beliefs that provide them with reasons. Persons and
principles of justice are unreasonable in so far as they do not tolerate
or accept that false beliefs can provide others with good reasons for
acting-good reasons in so far as these reasons fit with their rational
plan of life and reasonable comprehensive views. It would be
unreasonable for a professor to give an exam on Yom Kippur or
Good Friday and refuse to allow practicing Jewish or Christian
students a makeup date because their beliefs (assumedly) are false.
Their religious holy days provide practicing Jews and Christians with
good reasons for not attending an examination on those days, and for
me to be insensitive and unresponsive to these particular reasons
("personal reasons" as Scanlon would call them49) is to be
unreasonable. To insist that others cooperate with you only on
grounds and for reasons which you believe are true is the paradigm
case of an unreasonable person. All the religious, moral, and ethnic
fanatics in history meet this description. Even if creationism were
true, it would be unreasonable to expect everyone else to endorse it; it
could not serve as a source of public reasons, for there is no empirical
evidence for it. It does not fit with the ways of reasoning and kinds of
evidence that are part of public reason.
"Fair enough," one might say; "of course we should tolerate false
comprehensive views so long as their practice does not undermine the
requirements of justice and legitimacy. But what is objectionable is
that (A) Rawls sees people with such false beliefs, and even their false
beliefs too, as nonetheless reasonable (in a moral, even if not
necessarily epistemic, sense of 'reasonable'); moreover (B) a
reasonable political conception providing content to public reason
cannot even question the alleged truth of these false comprehensive
beliefs, but must accommodate or work around them; as a result (C)
these false beliefs influence the range of considerations and of
political conceptions which are themselves reasonable and which
provide content to public reason. But this means (D) public reason
ultimately deflects public acknowledgment of the truth about justice
and the legitimate use of political power and can inculcate or
propagate public affirmation of false principles. How can false
principles and beliefs provide a basis for legitimacy? Moreover, how
form after their death, and only 15 percent believe that Darwin's theory of
evolution is the best explanation for the origin of human life on Earth.
Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature 2 (2002)
(citation omitted).
49. See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 219 (1998).
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do governments show respect for persons as rational self-directing
agents by inculcating in them false beliefs regarding justice and
legitimate political power?"5 °
It is true that for Rawls reasonableness is largely a moral, not an
epistemic category. One can be fully reasonable, politically speaking,
and have reasonable views, and yet still have false metaphysical,
ethical, or religious beliefs.5 Here it is important to recognize that,
even if Rawls were to allow people with false beliefs to influence the
range of political conceptions that are seen as reasonable and
politically effective (not that I believe he does-see below), still he is
not advocating that justice and the conception of justice that is most
reasonable in any way assumes or is substantively influenced by these
or other false beliefs. For Rawls, the most reasonable conception of
justice is justice as fairness, and it (presumably) assumes no false
beliefs. (For example, the parties in the original position have only
true beliefs regarding the general information relevant to their
decision on principles of justice.52) The problem that Rawls confronts
in Political Liberalism is not the same problem as in A Theory of
Justice.5 In setting forth the conditions for reasonable conceptions of
justice that may provide content to public reason he is not directly
addressing the question of the true or (as he says) most reasonable
conception of justice that he addressed in A Theory of Justice. Instead
he speaks to the questions of the conditions of the stability of a liberal
constitution and its political legitimacy-its authority to make and
enforce coercive laws and legitimately use political power among
citizens who conceive of themselves as free and equal.
Given that these are the issues at stake in political liberalism, surely
a condition upon the legitimate use of political power among equals is
not that the following two conditions be met: (1) to be legitimate, laws
made pursuant to that power must accord wholly with requirements of
the true conception of justice, and (2) those who exercise that power
know this and are in a position to justify their exercise of power
according to the true comprehensive doctrine; moreover, those
subject to political power must be informed of the true doctrine (not
50. This objection is based on Joseph Raz's remarks in his paper, Disagreement in
Politics, 43 Am. J. Juris. 25, 42 (1998). With regard to the final question above, it
would be ironic if Rawls's account were subject to the criticism that it allows for
government's knowing inculcation of false beliefs among citizens. (Below I contend it
is not). For one of Rawls's primary arguments against utilitarianism and other
teleological conceptions is that they do allow for, if not require, the inculcation of
false beliefs regarding the bases of social cooperation when needed to achieve
stability. Justice as fairness rules out this potentiality by way of its publicity condition
on principles of justice. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 29, at 154-58.
51. For Rawls's definition of "reasonable persons" and "reasonable
comprehensive doctrine" see Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 49-50 and 59
respectively.
52. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 78, at 454.
53. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at xxxix.
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just what authorities believe is the true view). If these were the
conditions for the legitimate exercise of political power, then political
power has never been legitimately exercised and perhaps never will
be. For Rawls, it is enough for the legitimate exercise of political
power that those who exercise it be able to justify their actions by a
reasonable political conception that meets the reciprocity criterion. It
is not necessary for political legitimacy that all political power be
exercised only on terms allowed by the true comprehensive doctrine
and its account of justice. To hold that is to collapse the idea of
legitimacy into the idea of justice. Rawls always believed that justice
as fairness is the most reasonable (or true, if you will) political
conception and that it is in the best position to meet the criterion of
reciprocity and provide a basis for public justification required by the
liberal principle of legitimacy. But the superiority of justice as
fairness cannot be definitively established on the basis of public
reason alone. As a result, Rawls did not want to claim,
understandably, that only laws conforming exactly to justice as
fairness are legitimate, and he certainly did not want to claim that laws
were not legitimate unless those legislating and enforcing them
applied justice as fairness and could justify them by its terms. For
Rawls, the legitimate exercise of political power must meet certain
conditions of justice, namely respect the broad outlines of a liberal
constitution and requirements of "basic justice," but within these
parameters political power can be legitimately exercised without
being wholly just.
If these are the sorts of issues Rawls is addressing in formulating the
idea of public reason, then perhaps the objections mentioned above
are not as serious as they might seem. To begin with (and answering
the objections above in the order presented):
(A) If being reasonable means having no false fundamental or
significant beliefs, then there are few if any reasonable people. Also,
if beliefs cannot be reasonable without being true, then no one has
fully reasonable beliefs. This is not what Rawls means by
reasonableness.
Moreover, (B) What difference does it make that a political
conception of justice does not draw into question the false
comprehensive convictions of those to whom it is addressed, when it is
required that any reasonable political conception be freestanding of
the false (as well as true) values and metaphysical ideas that are
peculiar to peoples' comprehensive views? Is it really a liberal
constitution's role to insist of reasonable people who already accept
and observe liberal principles of justice that they must accept them for
the right comprehensive reasons, thereby imposing on reasonable
people against their conscientious convictions the true comprehensive
moral view?
More importantly, (C) since a reasonable political conception and
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public reason itself are freestanding of false comprehensive views and
are based on ideas implicit in democratic culture, the content of public
reason and the legitimacy of political power is not jeopardized by the
false comprehensive values or beliefs that reasonable citizens hold. If
then a reasonable political conception does contain false principles, it
is not due to inference from false judgments in comprehensive views
but to misinterpretation within public reason itself of the implications
of democratic ideas. Here it is relevant that Rawls does not see public
reason as consisting of false judgments or under the influence of false
comprehensive views. He says it involves "knowledge and ways of
reasoning-the plain truths now common and available to citizens
generally."54 Public reason is "part of the truth" and not the "whole
truth." In bracketing true (and false) comprehensive reasons, public
reason clearly limits the range of judgments that may be appealed to
and justified; but there is no reason to think that this renders "part of
the truth" partly false.
Finally, (D) regarding the potential falsity of the political
conceptions of justice that inform public reason and their role as a
basis for legitimacy: It is true that if all liberal conceptions of justice
(as defined by Rawls) are false, and instead some other non-liberal
conception is true (libertarianism, for example, or Straussian
perfectionism), then public reason involves inculcating false beliefs.
Then it may be that the entire project underlying political liberalism is
misguided, not just its account of public reason. But it is misguided
because liberalism itself is false, not simply because of some defect in
Rawls's account of public reason and public justification. For public
reason can accommodate the principles of justice of most any
comprehensive liberal doctrine (including Raz's, Rawls believed), so
long as it does not insist on what must be a perfectionist requirement,
namely that liberal justice requires of its citizens not just that they
accept and conform to liberal principles out of their sense of justice
but also that citizens accept liberal principles for the right reasons
according to the true comprehensive doctrine (and thus according to
Kantian autonomy, or utilitarianism, or liberal perfectionism, or ideal
discourse theory, or natural law doctrine, or whatever comprehensive
doctrine that is true). Short of this, for this to be a real objection, it
first has to be shown that liberalism is a false view (which is not
argued by those raising the objections above).
To sum up, three aspects of public reason can be distinguished: (1)
standards of judgment, evidence, inference, and reasoning; (2)
empirical judgments, that is the facts, reliable statistical regularities,
and uncontested scientific laws or generalizations; and (3) the political
values of democratic justice and the public conception of justice that
give content to public reason. Clearly Rawls did not see the standards
54. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 19, at 90.
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of inference, evidence, and justification that are to govern public
reasoning to be false or jeopardized by the falsity of reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. Nor did he intend to allow false empirical
judgments into public reasoning.5 So if public reason leads to false
judgments that are not the result of misapplying (1) or (2), then it
must be because of the falsity of (3), the values and principles of
liberal and democratic justice relied upon. But what reason do we
have to believe that these values and principles are false? This
question cannot be settled within public reason, for it takes these
values as given. The question would have to be settled on the basis of
argument among comprehensive views-those endorsing liberal and
democratic values versus those advocating non-liberal and non-
democratic values. Rawls believed justice as fairness, presented as a
comprehensive Kantian doctrine as in A Theory of Justice, is closer to
moral truth, or what is most reasonable, than any other
comprehensive doctrine of justice. Raz, Dworkin, and other liberals
endorsing different comprehensive liberal views think otherwise. But
according to Rawls, there is nothing about liberal comprehensive
views that would prevent their agreeing upon a liberal political
conception that provides content to public reason, and this political
conception will be true, assuming that any true comprehensive
doctrine (whether Rawls's, Raz's, Dworkin's, or anyone else's)
endorses the same principles.
These remarks go some way towards responding to certain
criticisms of Rawls and others who rely upon a moral idea of
reasonableness and reciprocity in justification. Joseph Raz
particularly objects to (1) the idea of justification to a person (which I
address in the next part), and (2) the claim that we can have any basic
obligation to justify the exercise of political power to people with false
beliefs about values and the origins of justice and political authority
(which would include many if not all people with religious beliefs, for
example). Raz contends that the mere fact that people
conscientiously believe something does not provide them with reasons
for anything. "Our reason is that, as we see it, things are so and so.
Naturally, we may be wrong."56 But if our beliefs are false, then we
cannot have reason to act upon them, even though we believe we do.
But if this is so, then the fact that others conscientiously believe
something does not provide them with reasons, nor should they expect
it to provide us with reasons either.57 If so, Raz contends, it is far from
55. Compare Rawls's claim regarding the original position: "[S]ince principles are
consented to in the light of true general beliefs about men and their place in society,
the conception of justice adopted is acceptable on the basis of these facts." Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, supra note 5, § 69, at 398.
56. Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 28.
57. Raz says, "If I do not think that the fact that I hold a view is a reason for me to
follow it, why should I think that it is a reason for others?" Id.
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obvious to what degree we should defer to others' judgments and aim
for consensus. It may be important to justify political authority to
people with false moral and metaphysical convictions, to bring them
to understand its bases and get them to agree, but deferring to
consensus should not be allowed to structure the idea of political
justification or provide a basis for political legitimacy. For Raz (and
many others) political justification is like justification of any other
kind in that it involves, not reasonable agreement, but showing
propositions and principles to be true. To justify moral principles to
people with false values is to show them the truth of those principles
and the falsity of their values. Moreover, public reason consists only
of true reasons. No principle or value that is false can provide anyone
with a reason for doing anything.
It is arguable whether or not false beliefs can provide reasons for
people with those beliefs. There is something to the suggestion by J.S.
Mill, that if our values and beliefs are the product of a freely chosen
plan of life that fits our "character" and is arrived at after critical
reflection, then we may have more reason to act on them than we do
the true values imposed on us by the dead hand of custom. Knowing
and acting on true judgments is not an absolute value or reason that
trumps all others. Second, while the false beliefs of others clearly do
not provide us with reasons to follow them in doing what those false
beliefs dictate, still we can be under a stringent duty and have
sufficient reasons to respect others following the dictates of their false
convictions, particularly if they involve freely chosen values of great
importance to a person. Respecting others as persons and as citizens
involves allowing them to non-coercively decide their values and
(within limits of justice) act on their chosen ways of life. This moral
requirement implies a duty to allow others to make their own
mistakes of judgment and action, and, within limits of justice, act on
their false beliefs as well. We do not respect others as persons by
insisting that they only act according to the true view about the
comprehensive good, and we surely do not respect them if they are
coercively required to observe only what we or the government
believes are true comprehensive values. But from the perspective of
citizens with different comprehensive views, this is how the public
political enforcement of any comprehensive doctrines appears,
whether it be the purported truths of religion, or the purported truths
of autonomy and individuality. It may be true that respect for persons
does not require respect for their false views." Still, respect for
persons as citizens does require allowing them to form and act on
their false views so long as they are within limits of justice. Otherwise,
where someone is coercively forced to act according to the
requirements of a comprehensive conception of values that person
58. Id. at 43.
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rejects, the perception will be that freedom of conscience and equal
political liberty has been violated. It is unreasonable force, Rawls
says, to insist that one's comprehensive view prevail when
constitutional essentials and basic justice is at stake.59
Raz and others who endorse liberal comprehensive doctrines would
surely reply that their doctrine does allow people to act upon their
false beliefs. What is rejected is the political liberal idea that
controversies over values, and therewith false comprehensive
doctrines, should in any way be allowed to affect the standards for the
legitimacy of constitutions. The correct standard for legitimacy is not
whether purportedly reasonable people with conflicting reasonable
comprehensive views endorse or reasonably can endorse the
constitution, but whether the constitution itself meets independent
standards that are true. Disagreement in politics is of no substantive
importance in determining standards of justification and legitimacy.
Only truth can justify and only truth can bestow legitimacy.6"
I have already discussed above why it is mistaken to understand
Rawls's account of public reason as if it allowed false comprehensive
doctrines and values to determine or even influence standards of
public reason, political justification, and political legitimacy: Public
reason derives its content from a liberal political conception that is
freestanding of all comprehensive doctrines. Moreover, this is not the
place to discuss and compare Raz's own complicated account of
reasons and justification in ethics.6' Still it should be noted that Raz's
disputes with Rawls evidence deep differences regarding the nature of
reasons and of justification, and their relationship to the requirements
of liberalism. For Rawls, political justifications in terms of public
reasons (as opposed to justifications in terms of comprehensive liberal
doctrines) are required to respect liberty of conscience and the
political autonomy and independence of democratic citizens. In the
context of political liberalism, to knowingly act on the truth (even if
we could know the whole truth) of the correct comprehensive (liberal)
doctrine (as opposed to what one believes the true doctrine) is still not
such a fundamental value that it trumps all others, particularly the
values of political reasonableness and the freedom and equality of
citizens. What is distinctive about Rawls's political liberalism is that
certain moral values are conceived as determining not just the kinds of
reasons political officials can appeal to in political justification but
also independent standards of moral objectivity, justification, and
validity that apply within the domain of the political. Political
liberalism is an extension of Rawls's earlier idea of the independence
of moral theory from metaphysics (which includes for Rawls any
59. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 247.
60. See Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 40-43.




doctrine of the nature of truth).62  For Rawls, standards of moral
justification, moral objectivity, and correctness of moral judgments
differ from standards appropriate for the sciences and other
theoretical disciplines. The idea originates with Kant that the
preeminent value of moral autonomy requires that standards for
justification originate in practical reason itself (reason "legislating"
principles for itself), and not be imposed from outside by an
independent metaphysical, moral or religious realm. For Kant, the
values of moral and individual autonomy require that reason be the
source of its own principles of action. In order to realize this moral
value, standards for moral justification, objectivity, and correctness
("validity") of moral judgments must conform to certain moral (not
just theoretical) requirements of practical reason.
Rawls "demythologizes" Kant's conception of pure reason and the
a priori and then extends Kant's basic idea. As Kant sees morality as
independent of "metaphysics," Rawls seeks to make a significant part
of morality-"the domain of the political"-independent of a
comprehensive morality as well, including Kantian morality and the
value of moral autonomy. For Rawls, political autonomy requires that
democratic citizens "legislate" principles for themselves, meaning that
they should be able, as reasonable citizens, to fully understand and
endorse constitutional principles and subordinate laws in their
capacity as free and equal citizens, as moved by their sense of justice.63
This is a moral ideal of citizens in a democratic society. But for this
moral ideal to be possible the standards for political justification and
legitimacy must differ from those required by other domains of
inquiry. For Kant, and for Rawls prior to political liberalism, a
conception of moral objectivity and valid moral judgment-judgment
from an impartial perspective that embodies all the requirements of
practical reason-provides the standard for valid and correct moral
judgments (or, if you will, moral truth). Moral constructivism is an
attempt to incorporate an ideal of the autonomy of reasonable and
rational moral agents into the procedures for moral justification that
issue in standards of moral truth (namely, moral principles). Similarly
for Rawls's political liberalism, an account of political objectivity and
reasonable political judgment-cast in terms of agreement in
judgment from an impartial perspective that embodies the basic ideals
62. See John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory (1975), reprinted in John
Rawls: Collected Papers 286 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
63. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 402.
[C]itizens gain full political autonomy when they live under a reasonably just
constitution securing their liberty and equality, with all of the appropriate
subordinate laws... and when they also fully comprehend and endorse this
constitution and its laws, as well as adjust and revise them as changing social
circumstances require, always suitably moved by their sense of justice and
the other political virtues.
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and requirements of democratic reason-provides the standard for
correct-that is, most reasonable-judgments of democratic justice.
Political constructivism seeks to represent an ideal of the political
autonomy of free and equal citizens who are reasonable and rational
in the objective procedures for political justification that issue in the
standards for "political truth," or what is most (politically) reasonable.
It is in order to fully realize the ideal of the political autonomy of free
and equal democratic citizens that Rawls sees it as necessary to
establish an account of political justification and public reasons, as
well as the political legitimacy of democratic constitutions and laws,
independent of conceptions of the truth of comprehensive (liberal)
doctrines.'
V. REASONABLE PERSONS, LIBERAL LEGITIMACY, AND POLITICAL
JUSTIFICATION
From the previous discussion of Raz's objections we have seen that
public reason and the liberal political conceptions that provide it with
content are not influenced by false comprehensive doctrines (even
when political conceptions are endorsed by doctrines with false
views). Rather, public reason and its political conceptions gain their
content from ideas and values implicit in democratic culture. In this
part and the next I emphasize how reasonableness for Rawls is
primarily a moral-political category, and that what is politically
reasonable is to be determined from the "public point of view"'65 of
reasonable and rational free and equal citizens, and not from the point
of view of any (nonpublic) reasonable comprehensive doctrine. This
means one has to be very careful not to import a particular
philosophical account of 'reasonable' into political liberalism that is at
odds with public reason itself. To illuminate this aspect of Rawls's
view, I address here some further arguments Joseph Raz makes
against Rawls.
A. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy
Raz criticizes the following principle: "a political authority is
legitimate only if its authority is established by a principle which all
64. The original position for Rawls is the objective "procedure of construction"
that specifies moral and political principles of justice. Rawls contends that the objects
of moral judgments (including moral principles of justice and moral facts) and true
judgments regarding them, are not prior to and independent of a procedure of
construction that results in moral principles; these principles in turn are needed to
specify the moral facts about which moral judgments are true. To then say that a
moral judgment is true is to say that the judgment accords with principles that are the
product of the objective procedure of judgment which incorporates all the
requirements of practical reason. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory (1980), reprinted in John Rawls: Collected Papers 303, 354 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 1999); see also Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 119-25.
65. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 384 n.16.
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people are committed to accepting by their current views, whatever
they are, provided only that they are reasonable. ' 66  Legitimate
political authority is then to be based on the agreement of reasonable
comprehensive views of people, or at least agreement among people
holding reasonable views.67
Here Raz objects that the agreement of those who hold
unreasonable views should count too in determining the legitimacy of
authority, since "their life and well-being are of moral consequence."68
Contractualists will reply (he continues) that the liberal criterion of
legitimacy is based in respect for rational self-directing agents as such.
Agents who hold unreasonable beliefs are unreasonable, and thus do
not respond to reason as they should. Hence (the contractualist
concludes), "the reason for treating people as rational self-directing
agents does not apply to them."69 But this reply, Raz says, does not
respond to his objection, for it refers to the
reasonableness/unreasonableness of people, whereas the
contractualist criterion for legitimacy refers to the reasonableness of
belief. It is not true that people with unreasonable beliefs are all
unreasonable people. Unreasonable people are "unyielding," or
unresponsive to reason and evidence. Beliefs however are
unreasonable "if they are, in relation to all the evidence available to
the experts, patently false."70  Reasonable people can have
unreasonable beliefs if that is all they have been exposed to (e.g. those
creationists who have only been exposed to creationism might be
reasonable people). Likewise unreasonable people can have
reasonable beliefs for the same reason.7' This shows that "one cannot
take the rejection of any proposition as in itself strong evidence that
the agent is unreasonable (in the sense in which this is a cognitive
vice)." Raz concludes that the contractualist criterion for political
legitimacy "has no political teeth. ' 72 For "[t]here is no proposition
which has currency in Western societies and which some people in
them could not reasonably accept."73  As Raz suggests later, "any
66. Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 33.
67. This implies, Raz says that "[t]he legitimacy of a political authority comes to
an end when the principles on which it is based no longer enjoy the agreement of all
the reasonable. This makes the principle very demanding." Id. at 33 n.9. Here it is
clear from the context that Raz means "reasonable views" rather than "reasonable
person."
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id.
71. Raz says that Rawls's moral definition of reasonable person-as one who has
the belief and disposition of valuing willing cooperation above all other virtues or
values-does not help here either; for as a belief or character trait it "is not one which
has any bearing on the intellectual virtues." It may turn out that a person who is
reasonable in Rawls's sense is unreasonable, cognitively speaking, and vice versa. Id.
at 36. This shows, Raz says, that Rawls misapplies his own test of legitimacy.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 37.
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convinced anarchist, or indeed anyone else who has a principled
objection to the current government, [has] a veto on its legitimacy."74
This argument has two major shortcomings: it misreads Rawls's
principle of legitimacy, and it relies on Raz's (not Rawls's) definition
of "reasonable." First, (the question of how to understand
"reasonable" aside) Rawls's principle does not say that political
legitimacy is based on the agreement on principles by all reasonable
views or doctrines, or agreement by all reasonable persons, or even
agreement by all persons (even reasonable persons) holding
reasonable views or doctrines. It says: "the exercise of political power
is legitimate only when it is exercised in fundamental cases in
accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all reasonable
citizens as free and equal might reasonably be expected to endorse."75
This indicates that political legitimacy depends upon acceptance from
a particular standpoint, that of reasonable and rational free and equal
citizens (guided by certain fundamental interests). The principle's
focus then is on (politically) reasonable persons who are defined in a
certain way-not (as Raz says) on any person who holds reasonable
views. Which principles are acceptable to people who have
reasonable views or subscribe to reasonable doctrines is simply not
Rawls's criterion of legitimacy. Nor is political legitimacy determined
by the consensus of reasonable views or doctrines themselves, or even
of reasonable persons judging from the standpoint of their reasonable
views. (Politically) reasonable persons holding reasonable views may
in fact reject laws that are politically reasonable and legitimate.
Conscientious liberal Quakers for example may reject all war, even if
in self-defense or to protect human rights. But this does not deprive a
just war of its legitimacy for Rawls.76 The important point is that
political legitimacy, like political reasonableness, both are to be
decided from the public point of view of reasonable democratic
citizens.77
In regarding political legitimacy as agreement on principles by all
reasonable views or persons holding reasonable views, Raz appears to
confuse political legitimacy with the idea of an overlapping consensus.
But overlapping consensus is a standard for stability, which is different
from political legitimacy. The political legitimacy of a constitution is a
precondition of its stability "for the right reasons." In effect Rawls's
74. Id. at 40.
75. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 393 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 393-94.
77. This is also evident from Rawls's first two statements of the principle in
Political Liberalism. See id. at 137, 217; see also supra note 19. Rawls's final statement
of the principle of legitimacy makes clear its basis in the criterion of reciprocity: "The
criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least
reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens." Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 578.
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idea of an overlapping consensus is a conjecture that all reasonable
doctrines in a well-ordered constitutional democracy can endorse,
each for their own particular reasons, only those constitutions based
on political conceptions that meet the liberal principle of legitimacy.
If they can, then a legitimate constitution is stable, not as a
compromise or modus vivendi, but "for the right reasons," namely for
the moral reasons endorsed by each reasonable view. On the other
hand, if too many reasonable views cannot endorse a legitimate
constitution, then legitimate liberal authority may be unstable. Then
the question becomes whether it is possible for a just constitution to
endure. But whether or not a reasonable doctrine departs, in whole
or part, from acceptance of the liberal political conception and is no
longer in an overlapping consensus, this does not deprive the
constitution or laws of their legitimacy. It is simply not true that Raz's
argument has shown that "any of the views, ideologies, philosophies,
religions, or what not which have currency in that society should
vindicate the principles of the constitution, or else they lack
legitimacy."78
B. The Idea of a Reasonable Person
To make the argument that Rawls's principle of legitimacy allows
most any ideology or misfit in society to defeat government's
legitimacy, Raz imports his own definition of "reasonable person" and
"reasonable belief" into his argument; these underlie his contention
that reasonable people (those responsive to reason and evidence) can
have most any unreasonable ("patently false") belief, and
unreasonable people can have any reasonable belief. Perhaps they
can on Raz's purely cognitive account of "reasonable," but this is not
Rawls's specification of the concept of a reasonable person. While
cognitive reasonableness to some degree (responding to evidence,
making logical inferences, etc.) must be presupposed in Rawls's
account (otherwise people could not think clearly),79  the
characteristics of politically reasonable persons Rawls designates are
mainly moral characteristics: a willingness to cooperate on fair terms;
78. Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 37. This misreading of Rawls's
principle of legitimacy underlies Raz's extraordinary claim that under this principle,
the anarchist can deprive any government of legitimacy, and even "the state has no
authority over the fanatical murderer. It does not even have authority to defend
people against him." Id. at 40. Clearly, anarchists and fanatical murderers are
unreasonable people with unreasonable views in Rawls's sense. Their actual or
hypothetical consent is not required or relevant for any of Rawls's purposes.
79. Here it is relevant that Rawls says that standards for what are to count as
politically reasonable judgments within public reason are informed by the guidelines
for inference, evidence and judgment that are part of public reason, as well as
"criteria and procedures of commonsense knowledge and ... the methods and




having a reasonable moral psychology, including a sense of justice;
appreciating and accepting the implications of the burdens of
judgment for social life, and so on. Given these characteristics, it is
simply not true that a reasonable person can accept most any
proposition, or that the rejection of any proposition is not evidence
that a person is unreasonable.80 Because of their moral-political
convictions and dispositions, reasonable persons in Rawls's sense are
responsive to public reason, and not just to reason in a cognitive sense.
There are all kinds of unreasonable propositions (in Raz's sense, and
in Rawls's) which conflict with public reason and which for this reason
are not acceptable to politically reasonable persons.8 ' Raz's claim that
the principle of legitimacy "has no teeth" does not apply to Rawls.
The same problem besets Raz's argument that being unreasonable
and having unreasonable beliefs is not a moral defect that should
exclude a person from influencing what principles are legitimate. An
absence of the characteristics and beliefs of politically reasonable
persons is decidedly a moral defect. Politically unreasonable people
are not willing to cooperate with others on fair terms; they insist on
politically enforcing what they believe to be "whole truth" even
though they know that others reasonably disagree; they do not have a
sense of justice or other moral dispositions. Anyone who has all these
characteristics and all they entail is deeply flawed morally: For he or
she has no respect for others with different values or for their rights,
and thus is hardly fit for social life, at least not among people who do
not think as he or she does. Of course the lives of politically
unreasonable people, so described, should count as much as anyone
else's in so far as they have the same rights and liberties (so long as
they do not violate others' basic rights.) But this does not imply that
their unreasonable views should be taken into account and
accommodated within public reason.
C. The Bases of Legitimacy
Is Rawls's principle of legitimacy designed so as to achieve respect
for rational self-directed agents as such (as Raz suggests)? Here it is
more accurate to say that it is (in part) directed to achieving the
political autonomy of free and equal democratic citizens, when seen as
politically reasonable and rational. Political liberalism aspires to
discover a basis for social cooperation and the exercise of political
authority that is freely acceptable to reasonable democratic citizens.
If we see the principle of legitimacy in this way, then Rawls's
principle-unlike the principle Raz attributes to him-quite readily
80. Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 36.
81. Indeed there are many reasonable propositions in Raz's sense, and reasonable
doctrines in Rawls's sense, which are not acceptable to public reason, and which
(Rawls's) reasonable citizens will not insist on as a basis for their political relations,
even though they may believe them true.
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converges with the argument (summarized above) Raz attributes to
contractualists for excluding unreasonable persons from the test for
political legitimacy. The reason the agreement of politically
unreasonable persons is not necessary, or even desirable, for political
legitimacy of principles is that, as unreasonable, they are not simply
unyielding in their judgments, but are also intolerant of other
reasonable comprehensive views and the reasonable persons who
endorse them. So most anything politically unreasonable people
might agree to regarding constitutional essentials and basic justice
could not be justified to reasonable and rational citizens endorsing
reasonable views or comprehensive doctrines.
D. Political and Public Justification
Rawls says, "Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but
argument addressed to others."82  Raz questions the idea of
justification to a person. "The claim is that a condition of legitimacy is
that the principles on which the constitution is founded can be
justified to the people who are supposed to be subject to them. Does
that mean more than that the principles of the constitution are
justified?"83 He argues that it cannot, citing a number of reasons: (1)
justifications are not "inherently private" or addressed to specific
people, as the contractarian position implies, but "are in principle
publicly available";' (2) some people are not capable of
understanding justifications of authority, due to limited mental
capacities, or mistaken ideologies, or misguided religious beliefs;85 and
(3) justifications do not have to be articulated to be known and
understood, and in any case, "full articulation of the justification of
authority is impossible in practice."86
This is not the place to fully respond to Raz's criticisms of Rawls's
idea of justification to a person, for to do so adequately would require
a discussion of Raz's more general argument against contractarianism,
put forth elsewhere, as well as his alternative conception of reasons
and justification, which are themselves quite complicated. But it can
at least be emphasized that Rawls's idea of justification does not imply
addressing arguments designed to convince people whatever their
circumstances, capacities, beliefs, and desires. What Rawls calls
"political justification" (which is part of "public justification") does
not even require justification to reasonable people in the terms of
standards set by their reasonable comprehensive views. Rather,
political justification is addressed to persons seen as reasonable and
rational and in their capacity as free and equal citizens. Moreover it is
82. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 594.
83. Raz, Disagreement in Politics, supra note 50, at 37.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id. at 39.
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framed in terms of the political values of justice and of public reason.
On this understanding of political justification, some (if not all) of the
criticisms Raz directs at Rawls are wide of their mark. For example
(in response to (1) above), on Rawls's account political justifications
are inherently public, for they are addressed to persons who occupy
the "public point of view" of reasonable democratic citizens.
Moreover, (2) they are not tailored to meet the limited capacities,
mistaken ideologies, or particular interests people have, but address
them as reasonable and rational democratic citizens with an interest in
developing and exercising the moral powers needed to engage in
social cooperation.
To appreciate better what Rawls means by "justification to
persons" it may help here to look to his late article, Reply to
Habermas.87 Here Rawls distinguishes three kinds of justification at
work in political liberalism. (1) Political justification is justification to
persons in their capacity as reasonable democratic citizens; it is
justification in terms of public reasons and hence relies on political
values and their ordering in terms specified by a freestanding political
conception of justice. Political justification is in this manner pro tanto
Rawls says; it does not take into account all moral and other values, as
they might be ordered by a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. (2)
Full justification, Rawls says, "is carried out by an individual citizen as
a member of civil society."88  Full justification is justification to a
person in terms of his or her reasonable comprehensive doctrine. In
full justification a reasonable person incorporates the political
conception of justice that is politically justified into, and justifies it
according to the terms of, his or her own reasonable comprehensive
doctrine by bringing his or her judgments into reflective equilibrium.
This is a task left to citizens themselves, together with others who
affirm the same reasonable comprehensive doctrine. "The political
conception gives no guidance in such questions, since it does not say
how non-political values are to be counted. This guidance belongs to
citizens' comprehensive doctrines."89 Notice that while there are as
many full justifications as there are reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, full justification is not justification to persons whatever
their subjective dispositions and whatever values they may affirm.
Rawls's philosophy does not encompass justification to a person
regardless of his or her aims or intelligence or subjective point of view.
Instead, a full justification addresses reasonable and rational persons
who occupy the standpoint and affirm the values and ideals of one or
another reasonable comprehensive view. Moreover, while full
justification involves justification of the political conception according
to the terms of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are not
87. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 393.
88. Id. at 386.
89. Id. at 386-87.
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wholly true-"mistaken ideologies" in Raz's terms-the falsities
affirmed by a doctrine do not influence or affect the truth or
reasonableness of the freestanding political conception itself (as
discussed in the previous section).
Finally there is (3) Public justification: A condition of public
justification of the political conception of justice is that it stands in full
justification (or reflective equilibrium) within the terms of all
reasonable comprehensive doctrines endorsed in society. There is
then a reasonable overlapping consensus among reasonable
comprehensive doctrines.90 Given an overlapping consensus, each
reasonable member of society can aver to others that the reasonable
comprehensive doctrine he or she endorses both incorporates andjustifies (in terms peculiar to each reasonable doctrine) the liberal
political conception that is recognized to be politically justified.
"[T]his mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the public
culture of political society."91  It is this public knowledge of a
reasonable overlapping consensus-citizens' awareness of the fact that
each reasonable citizen has fully justified and embedded the political
conception into his or her reasonable comprehensive view-that
constitutes (for the most part) the public justification of the political
conception. 92
E. Legitimacy and False Beliefs Revisited
Finally, Rawls is clearer in his late works that there is a "family of
reasonable political conceptions of justice" that provides content to
public reason, and which therefore plays a role in political and public
justification. These political conceptions are reasonable in that they
all affirm the essential features of liberalism (viz., the basic liberties
and their priority, and a social minimum). But liberal political
conceptions differ in a number of ways: how they specify the social
minimum and equality of opportunity, determine the fair value of the
political liberties, and assign significance to other political values of
90. Id. at 388.
91. Id. at 387.
92. Id. at 392. Two other aspects of public justification are stability for the right
reasons and political legitimacy. Political legitimacy has been discussed. As for
stability, when there is an overlapping consensus on the most reasonable political
conception, society is effectively regulated by this conception, and public political
discussions on constitutional essentials are reasonably decidable in terms of public
reason as informed by the family of political conceptions, society is then "[stable] for
the right reasons." Id. at 391. For each citizen now endorses the governing political
conception, not as a compromise, but because it expresses the conception of justice
that is best justified according to his or her own reasonable comprehensive doctrine.
See id. In the terms used in A Theory of Justice, the right is then congruent with each
citizen's good, as determined by her rational plan of life and the reasonable




public reason.13 "Reasonable political conceptions ... do not always
lead to the same conclusion; nor do citizens holding the same
conception always agree on particular issues."94 If so, then at most
only one of these political conceptions can be completely true. But
the fact that the others contain false beliefs to some degree (regarding
how to set the social minimum, for example) does not imply that
government officials, when they rely on them, are, as Raz contends,
"inculcating" or "propagating" false beliefs among its citizens,
certainly not knowingly; and even if unknowingly, then not any more
so than any government or society inculcates false beliefs in its
members when it allows for freedom of speech and discussion.
Democratic citizens and government officials (legislators and often
judges too) can always argue about and contest the laws and the
correct understanding of constitutional provisions, and even the
alternative liberal conceptions of justice that are appealed to in public
reason to justify laws. What they cannot do, if they are to satisfy the
moral (not legal) duty of civility, is contest liberalism itself, or provide
reasons incompatible with a liberal constitution. It is true that public
reason inculcates the values of a liberal and democratic constitution.
But this is a problem only if liberal and democratic constitutions all
embody false conceptions of justice. Only then would government
officials in a constitutional democracy propagate and inculcate false
beliefs in a way that should cause serious concern from the
perspective of the true comprehensive view. But since Raz endorses
liberalism and democracy, this is not a problem that he is concerned
about.
VI. THE COMPLETENESS OF PUBLIC REASON
Is the idea of public reason feasible? That is, is public reason up to
the task of providing a basis for public justification in all, or nearly all,
issues regarding constitutional essentials and basic justice? One
common objection to the idea of public reason is that it is not very
deep, or at least not sufficiently deep to deal with all the political
issues it needs to if it is to serve as a basis for constitutional
argument.95 It is said that, because people have such different
93. Rawls seems to hold that liberal political conceptions endorse roughly the
same basic liberties, those, "familiar from constitutional democratic regimes." Rawls,
The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 36, at 440; see also Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 8, at xlviii-xlix, 6; Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
supra note 14, at 581. He also says that liberal political conceptions all endorse ideas
of citizens as free and equal persons, and of society as a fair system of social
cooperation over time, yet interpret these ideas in different ways. Id. at 582.
94. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 606 (citation
omitted).
95. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 106-20,




comprehensive views in a liberal democracy, there is little hope of
their agreeing on values and principles to the degree needed to
resolve many highly disputed constitutional issues. The problem of
abortion is often brought up in this connection. To resolve this
problem politically, inevitably officials and citizens will have to appeal
to comprehensive views to interpret the scope of basic constitutional
liberties and other abstract liberal principles they all agree on.
Here it is worth re-emphasizing that Rawls sees public reason as
gaining its content from a political conception of justice. One of the
main roles of political conceptions of justice in Rawls's account of
public reason is that they should enable public reason to be complete.
In the absence of a political conception, public justification cannot be
carried through and the duty of civility remains unfulfilled-we could
not then provide justifications that others could reasonably accept in
their capacity as free and equal citizens.
But the fact that political conceptions of justice provide content to
public reason does not adequately respond to the objection since it
only states, but does not show, that public reason actually is capable of
providing satisfactory arguments for all constitutional essentials and
questions of basic justice. But for that matter, it is hard to see how
one could satisfactorily answer this broadside objection without first
trying to work out in some detail resolutions to most constitutional
disputes by relying solely on public reason.96 One issue the objection
forces however is, what is a complete resolution of a dispute (for
example, regarding the right of abortion) which can be addressed
solely in terms of public reason? Clearly, a complete resolution
cannot be a general consensus, for that is hardly if ever to be had for
any significant constitutional dispute. For Rawls, a complete
resolution is not even one that every reasonable person accepts on the
basis of his or her reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Again, such a
resolution may not be possible for many issues under any
circumstances. Instead, for Rawls, a resolution regarding a
constitutional essential is always a political resolution: It is one that is
framed in terms of political values of public reason and is an argument
to a conclusion which reasonable persons in their capacity as
democratic citizens can reasonably expect other citizens in the same
capacity reasonably to accept.
Two questions need be kept separate here. First there is the
question of whether public reason is capable of politically resolving a
constitutional essential such as the abortion issue, in terms of the
political values of public reason and without appealing to
comprehensive reasons and doctrines. Second, there is the question
of whether all reasonable citizens affirming reasonable comprehensive
doctrines can accept the political resolution provided by public reason
96. Cf Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 395.
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on the basis of their comprehensive doctrines. We have seen that the
first question is to be addressed in terms of public reasons and
political values that address the circumstances and interests of free
and equal citizens. In response to the first question, Rawls gives an
example of the kinds of public reasons that need to be taken into
account in politically resolving the abortion dispute, (suggesting that
other political values may also be relevant).97 Among the political
values relevant to abortion he suggests are due respect for human life,
freedom and equality of women, and society's interests in the family
and the ordered reproduction of liberal society over time. He says
(without arguing the point) that a reasonable balance of these and
other relevant political values does provide a politically reasonable
answer-one satisfactory to reasonable persons in their capacity as
free and equal citizens-to the question of whether women should
have a right to abortion at some stage of pregnancy. The answer he
believes justified on the basis of these political values is that women
should have such a right during the first trimester. It may be that he
would be open to the suggestion that a longer term, perhaps even a
somewhat shorter term, is also politically reasonable. But Rawls says
that to afford women no right to abortion is unreasonable.
Presumably he says this because to refuse to recognize a right to abort
under any circumstance is to give absolute weight to one political
value (respect for human life) at the expense of all others-and this is
politically unreasonable. It is unreasonable since the reasonable
balance of public reasons is to be determined by taking into account
such considerations as the interests of citizens in maintaining the
conditions of their freedom and equality, their higher-order interests
in the moral powers, and other political values regarding the good of
citizens. A reasonable balance of public reasons is not to be
determined by taking into account the religious, philosophical, or
moral values of people occupying one or another comprehensive view.
The important point here is that the question of the completeness of
public reason regarding abortion depends upon whether there is a
balance of political values that is satisfactory to reasonable persons in
their capacity as free and equal citizens, in light of the political
conception of justice they affirm. My own view is that, because Rawls
recognizes a family of political conceptions providing content to
public reason, there has to be more than one politically reasonable
answer to this issue.98 That is, far from being incomplete, public
97. Id. at 243 n.32.
98. See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 606
("Reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same
conclusion; nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular
issues." (citation omitted)); see also Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at lvi.
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reason is overdetermined in so far as it provides more than one
politically reasonable answer to many constitutional issues. 99
Now the second question mentioned above-which, recall, needs to
be kept separate from the first question of the alleged completeness of
public reason-is whether reasonable people, given the reasonable
comprehensive doctrines they affirm, will in fact accept the political
resolution of the abortion problem as determined by a proper balance
of public reasons. Perhaps some won't even in a well-ordered society.
So it may be that there are some reasonable people who cannot accept
the political resolution of the abortion issue in terms of public reason.
They sincerely believe that the fetus is a (metaphysical and moral)
person, at all or most stages of development; that to abort it is or is
like murder; that since protecting the lives of innocent persons is the
most important human value, it is morally and politically unjust for
any government to permit abortions at any stage for any reason; and
that they as individuals ought to politically reject (and perhaps even
resist) abortion whatever the cost to themselves. In that case, a citizen
is no longer able to fully affirm the politically reasonable resolution-
one based in the political values of public reason-as a sufficient basis
for resolving all constitutional essentials. He or she will not then be in
a position to fulfill the duty of civility (which makes perfectly good
sense from their point of view, given that protecting the innocent
against murder is the more important issue).
This may indeed happen, even in a well-ordered constitutional
democracy governed by a liberal political conception that is endorsed
by all reasonable doctrines. Rawls does not rule it out. The main
point however is that the fact that some reasonable people or
reasonable doctrines may not be able to accept the resolution of the
abortion issue as determined in terms of political values of public
reason does not imply that public reason is incomplete or that it is
incapable of resolving a constitutional essential or matter of basic
justice. What it implies is that not all reasonable people or reasonable
comprehensive doctrines are always capable of accepting the
politically reasonable resolution to constitutional disputes provided by
public reason as informed by a political conception of justice."' Is this
a problem for Rawls? It will be a problem only if, as a result of their
inability to accept the political resolution by public reason for one or
more constitutional issues (e.g. regarding abortion), they are led to
reject public reason itself in all other cases. Then those citizens and
99. Jon Mandle clarified this point for me with regard to abortion.
100. In his initial treatment of public reason, in Political Liberalism, Rawls seems
to say that for a citizen to reject the conclusions of public reason is to be politically
unreasonable, but that "a comprehensive doctrine is not as such unreasonable
because it leads to an unreasonable conclusion in one or even in several cases. It may




their comprehensive doctrine can no longer endorse a political
conception of justice in an overlapping consensus with other
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Depending on how many
citizens and how many reasonable comprehensive doctrines are in this
position, it raises questions regarding the stability of the family of
liberal political conceptions. But Rawls conjectures that, even though
some reasonable comprehensive doctrines may not be able to accept
the resolution to a disputed constitutional issue on the basis of public
reason, still in a just and well-ordered constitutional democracy, they
will be able to endorse in the main the requirements of a liberal
political conception and the deliberations of public reason. This
mainly is all that is required for "stability for the right reasons."
Rawls discusses just this kind of case in his last work on public
reason. His main example is Quakers, who are pacifists, and who for
religious reasons reject all war, even when it is politically justified in a
just society on the basis of public reason. °1 On all other political
issues but war, Quakers can endorse constitutional democracy and can
abide by its legitimate laws decided on the basis of the political values
of public reason. Rawls seems to say that, so long as they recognize it
as legitimate law and accept the obligation not to violate the law,
Quakers act properly when, through "witnessing," they express their
dissent from public reason and laws allowing for just war, thereby
letting other citizens "know the deep basis of their strong opposition"
and "bear[ing] witness to their faith by doing so."102 In this
connection, Rawls alludes to "the parallel case of Catholic opposition
to abortion,"10 3 and apparently sees religious witnessing against all
abortions as appropriately expressed in the same way, even though it
is not an expression of public reason, but indeed opposes the
conclusions of public reason. Both examples are appropriate
exercises of freedom of speech, certainly in the "background culture,"
if not in the public political forum or by government officials
executing their duties.
As I understand Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson's position,
which in many respects resembles Rawls's, this is one area in which
they nonetheless disagree with him."° "[Plolitics cannot be purged of
moral conflict" in their view.0  The "value of public reason "106 is
mainly expressed via a requirement of deliberative reciprocity, that
"reasons must be mutually acceptable"107 to equal citizens. But even
101. See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 594 n.57.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
(1996).
105. Id. at 93.
106. Id. at 67.
107. Id. at 54. "When citizens make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they
[should] appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens who are
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given this principle of reciprocity, Thompson and Gutmann say that
there are certain fundamental "deliberative disagreement[s]"-
"conflicts in which moral reasons so deeply divide citizens that no
resolution seems possible on any fair terms of cooperation. 108
Deliberative disagreements are "fundamental because citizens differ
not only about the right resolution but also about the reasons on
which the conflict should be resolved."1 9 The controversy over the
legalizing of abortion is the paradigm case of a deliberative
disagreement.1"0  In the case of deliberative disagreements like
abortion "government must take a stand on questions involving such
disagreement, even if reciprocity... do[es] not determine the
answer." ' To resolve such disagreements government officials and
citizens must appeal to moral considerations that are not acceptable to
one another. Here I assume they mean that officials as well as citizens
are to decide in terms of their conscientious moral convictions, after
considering all relevant reasons.112 But in so doing they should
practice an "economy of moral disagreement,"'' 3 namely, "seek the
rationale that minimizes rejection of the position they oppose.-'14
Gutmann and Thompson's position differs from Rawls's in allowing
appeals within the public political forum to moral values that Rawls
would see as belonging to comprehensive doctrines rather than the
political values of public reason. In this regard, Gutmann and
Thompson do not see public reason (in their sense of mutually
acceptable reasons) as complete. I do not think that they would see
public reason in Rawls's sense as complete or adequate to its task
either. Why this is so, I am not sure. It may be that Gutmann and
Thompson see the political values of public reason Rawls appeals to
(respect for human life, equality of women, etc.) as insufficient to
provide either or both (a) a constitutional solution to the abortion
problem or (b) a satisfactory solution acceptable to all the parties in
the abortion dispute. Some have argued that to provide either a
constitutional solution or a mutually acceptable solution to the
abortion dispute, the question of the metaphysical personhood of the
fetus must be decided, or at least the fetus's moral status must be
addressed and decided one way or the other."5
similarly motivated" to find fair terms of social cooperation. Id. at 55.
108. Id. at 73.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 74.
111. Id. at 77.
112. This is implied by certain "principles of accommodation" the authors discuss.
See id. at 79-91. Gutmann and Thompson discuss a principle of civic integrity,
requiring consistency and integrity of principle, and a principle of civic magnanimity,
requiring, among other things, taking opposing arguments seriously and being open to
changing one's convictions. Id.
113. Id. at 84 (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. at 84-85 (citation omitted).
115. In Life's Dominion, Ronald Dworkin contends that the question of the
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This is just the sort of claim that Rawls hopes to avoid with the idea
of public reason. While Rawls does not explicitly say so, I believe the
best way to understand his position is as follows. Questions regarding
the metaphysical personhood of the fetus, or its moral status as a
being with interests are not questions resolvable by public reason and
about which free and equal citizens can reasonably agree. But it is not
necessary to resolve them to address the political issue of abortion and
whether women have constitutional rights of choice at some stage of
pregnancy. On political grounds of public reason reasonable citizens
can agree that no abortion rights at all are a severe restriction on
women's freedom and their ability to function as equals in social and
civic life. Moreover, there is no compelling case that the fetus is a
person, constitutionally speaking. It does not have the capacities of
political personhood (the moral powers) even in an undeveloped
state. This does not necessarily imply that constitutionally speaking
the fetus is not a person; for while having these capacities are clearly
sufficient for constitutional personhood, 16 they may not be necessary.
Still there has to be some compelling case for the constitutional
personality of the fetus if we are to limit altogether women's freedom
to choose, and it has not been (and it is not clear how it could be)
established in terms satisfactory to public reason. Hence the reason
that women should have rights of choice is that there are substantial
political values and interests-regarding women's privacy, their social
and civic equality, and their freedom-that would be greatly burdened
by an absence of rights of choice. Moreover there is no indication or
agreement that any person, constitutionally speaking, would be
burdened by women exercising rights of choice. Given these
substantial political values, the burden of proof should reside on the
side of opponents to choice, to make the case that there are
sufficiently compelling public political reasons that justify burdening
those political values and interests. That there are such burdens on
women's interests should not be a point of dispute between pro-choice
personhood of the fetus should be avoided politically since it is so ambiguous. See
Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom 22-23 (1993). He states that in fact very few opponents of
abortion actually believe the fetus is a person, see id. at 13, and he is clearly skeptical
about the claim that it is, see id. at 112. Still, he claims, the fetus prior to six months is
incapable of having rights, since it is incapable of experiences, and therefore
incapable of having interests. See id. at 14-21. Moreover, he implies, the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), implicitly made such a decision in finding
in favor of a right of abortion. See Dworkin, supra, at ch. 4.
116. That possession of (a capacity for) the moral powers is sufficient for
constitutional personhood takes care of the ridiculous argument which says that, "For
pro-choice advocates to question the personhood of the fetus is just like supporters of
slavery questioning the personhood of slaves." The correct reply is that clearly slaves
do possess the moral powers and deserve to be treated as persons under the




and anti-choice views, for these are political values of public reason
acceptable to reasonable citizens. The disagreement rather is (or
should be) over whether there are sufficient public reasons for
overriding those political values. The pro-choice argument is that
there is no acceptable case within public reason for the constitutional
personhood of the fetus, and that the political value of due respect for
a form of human life is not sufficiently compelling, for public political
reasons, during its gestation to completely outweigh the political
values regarding women's political interests; therefore there is no
acceptable case for burdening women's privacy, equality, and liberty
so completely as to deny any right of choice.117
This is, I believe, a better way to understand the position the
Supreme Court adopted in Roe v. Wade"8 than the position which
contends that the Court could not avoid the (metaphysical) question
of the personhood of the fetus and indeed must have found that it was
not a person. Of course, as Dworkin points out,'19 Justice Blackmun's
argument from precedent-that the fetus is not a person within the
terms of the Constitution because it has never has been treated as
such in law or under the Constitution-is not a satisfactory argument.
The Court might have said the same thing (and probably did) about
slaves before the Civil War Amendments, but clearly this would not
be a justification for perpetuating the injustice of slavery. But
Blackmun might have gone on to say that, whatever its metaphysical
or moral status according to the most reasonable comprehensive
doctrine, the fetus is not protected by equal protection or the Due
Process Clause protecting life, liberty and property, since no
acceptable justification has been provided within public reason for
treating the fetus as a constitutional person. 120
117. The point then is that the pro-choice and the anti-choice positions are not
symmetrical. The uncontroversial burdens placed upon women by a ban on abortion,
and the lack of any obvious constitutional person who is burdened by abortion,
establish an asymmetry that imposes a special argumentative burden on the anti-
choice position, which it cannot meet in terms of public reason. I am grateful to
Joshua Cohen for suggesting this argument, especially for the idea that Rawls does
not have to deny the constitutional personhood of the fetus to argue in favor of a
constitutional right to choose.
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Dworkin made this point in discussion at the Fordham conference on Rawls.
In Life's Dominion Dworkin seems to assign greater weight to precedent in
establishing the claim that the fetus is not a constitutional person. See Dworkin, supra
note 115, at 109-12.
120. 1 do not mean to claim here that my interpretation of Roe v. Wade provides a
better "fit" along the lines of Professor Dworkin's account of Law as Integrity than
does his own reading, which sees the Court as appealing to comprehensive reasons.
Law as Integrity would require that Roe be read in light of later abortion decisions,
including Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and other constitutional
privacy cases. In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter appealed to the
value of personal autonomy as a reason for upholding women's right to abortion. Id.
at 851. This appeal to autonomy seems to be nothing more than an appeal to the
liberty and equality of women to control their own lives unimpeded by legal
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Now for the second question I distinguished above-whether
political values of public reason can provide a satisfactory solution,
moral or political, to all reasonable persons. That of course will
depend on the content of their reasonable comprehensive views and
the priority they give to political values of justice. It may well be that
many reasonable orthodox Catholics and Jews and theologically
conservative Protestants in a well-ordered constitutional democracy
will never be able to morally accept the political right to abortion that
Rawls sees as justified on the basis of public reason (assuming that he
is right that a constitutional right is so justified on that basis). But this
does not mean that they must reject public reason or even the political
legitimacy of abortion rights (here Rawls cites Governor Cuomo's
lecture on abortion).12 Moreover, even if they do reject the moral
and political legitimacy of abortion rights, it still does not mean they
must reject the requirements of public reason in all other
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. They are in the
same position as Quakers who reject the politically liberal account of
just war: Even though they dissent from the conclusions of public
reason on that issue, and see the law as itself unjust and not morally
legitimate, this does not mean that they must reject the political
legitimacy of the law or of the constitution. This of course will be
decided by their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. But I conjecture
that there are few reasonable opponents of abortion who are prepared
to abandon democracy, or who, aware of the burdens of judgment, are
prepared to abandon public reason and use whatever political means
are available to legally enforce the demands of their comprehensive
views.
It is important to emphasize once again that Rawls's main concern
in political liberalism is to show how a well-ordered constitutional
democracy governed by a liberal political conception is practicably
possible, that is, "stable for the right reasons," and politically
legitimate. He is not trying to argue, nor does he need to argue for his
restrictions on their reproductive decisions. As such, it is a legitimate public reason.
But suppose O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter meant autonomy in the full sense, as a
kind of positive freedom that partially defines the human good, and that underlies the
comprehensive liberalism of Kant, Mill, early Rawls, and perhaps Dworkin too. On
that reading of Casey, it may well be that the best way to understand the abortion
decisions is that they do appeal to comprehensive values and perhaps even a
metaphysical conception of personhood. But this would not undermine Rawls's view
of a supreme court as an "exemplar of public reason." Rawls, Political Liberalism,
supra note 8, at 231. Rather it would mean that the U.S. Supreme Court, as it
sometimes does, improperly (and perhaps unnecessarily) has gone beyond the
strictures of public reason and appealed to comprehensive reasons, to justify a
decision that is justifiable (or perhaps is not) purely on the basis of public reasons.
Sometimes the best interpretation of constitutional law according to Law as Integrity
may not accord with the political values of public reason. But I do not see how by
itself this can be an objection to Rawls's account of public reason.
121. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 607 n.83.
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purposes, that all reasonable persons morally will agree on all the
politically reasonable decisions reached by deliberations based on
public reason. As we have seen, clearly some will not (Quakers and
liberal orthodox Catholics). So the fact that public reason does not
take into account all reasons that are relevant to deciding "the whole
truth" regarding the moral permissibility of abortion should not raise
serious problems for his account. Serious problems arise only if many
reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a well-ordered constitutional
democracy cannot endorse a liberal political conception in an
overlapping consensus and accept as politically legitimate most (not
necessarily all) of the deliberations and conclusions of public reason
based on the family of liberal political conceptions.
Finally, at this conference Ronald Dworkin raised an important
question that I cannot fully address but which demands at least
mention and a brief reply. Dworkin says that the idea of public
reason is not well-formed. His objection, as I understand it, is as
follows:
Rawls says political officials and democratic citizens are under a
duty of civility, to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and give reasons
for policies they support to others that they could reasonably accept.
Suppose someone finds a comprehensive doctrine, such as Kant's or
Mill's defense of liberty in terms of autonomy, not only reasonable
but also persuasive. Or suppose, like Professor Dworkin, one finds
reasonable an argument for equality that begins with a view about the
objective and equal importance of every human life going well-which
is part of a comprehensive ethical position. What is there to prevent
him from thinking that other reasonable people could reasonably
accept the comprehensive position that he finds not only reasonable
but persuasive? What prevents him from saying of such people, "Yes,
if they are reasonable, they can accept this; maybe they won't, but
they can." Now Rawls may reply that Dworkin is asking the wrong
question: The question is not "Can they reasonably accept this as
people, or from the point of view of their comprehensive view?" but
"Can they reasonably accept it in their capacity as free and equal
citizens?" But it is not clear if this limitation means anything. It may
be that in his account of public reason Rawls builds into the definition
of free and equal persons that they are persons who demand and will
offer only arguments of a certain kind. But that is not helpful. What
is needed is an account of why the notion of justification to others as
reasonable and rational and free and equal citizens prevents one from
saying that citizens, if they are reasonable, could or should reasonably
endorse this comprehensive position.122
Here it is important to recognize that the notion of reasonableness,
122. I rely on a transcription of Professor Dworkin's remarks at the conference
(transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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like the notion of "reason," is itself constrained by political liberalism
and the requirements of public political argument. The sense in which
Dworkin (and others) contend that it is reasonable for other
reasonable citizens to accept their comprehensive doctrines is not the
sense of reasonableness used in political liberalism. To take a parallel
case (suggested to me by Joshua Cohen): Pope John Paul II says in
Evangelium Vitae123 that we can know by reason that the fetus has the
rights of a human person from conception and that abortion is a
crime. The empiricist and the Kantian deny this and also deny that we
can know God's existence by reason. The empiricist, Kantian, and
Catholic natural law theorist clearly have different views of reason, its
operation, and its competence. But surely when the Pope says that
the pro-choice position is unreasonable-because reason tells us that
life begins with conception-and that we can reasonably expect
everyone, insofar as they are reasonable, to accept the anti-choice
view, he is relying on a view about reason that cannot be part of a
liberal political conception. The same is true of the empiricist's notion
of reason, and the Kantian idea of (pure) reason. Opponents of
natural law (or of Hume's or Kant's views of reason and
reasonableness) may be, in some comprehensive sense,
"unreasonable," but they are not politically unreasonable.
The more general point here (and again I am indebted to Joshua
Cohen) is that Rawls's idea of the domain of the political implies that
we cannot generate the need for and requirements of a liberal political
conception by starting "outside" political argument with a
philosophical conception of reason and reasonableness. Reason and
reasonableness themselves need to be given a moral-political
interpretation in terms of what is appropriate to demand/expect of
others in their capacity as democratic citizens. So Rawls specifies the
ideas of public reason, and political reasonableness. When is someone
being unreasonable, politically speaking? That is in part a matter of
working out whether someone is offering and insisting on using
considerations in political justification that are unsuited to the setting
of justification addressed to free and equal persons with different
reasonable comprehensive views. It is politically unreasonable for
legislators, judges, and lawyers engaged in constitutional argument to
rely on Catholic natural law doctrine in deciding whether women have
a right to abortion. But the same is true of other comprehensive
metaphysical and moral doctrines.
With this as background, let us consider now whether it is
reasonable (as Dworkin contends) for those who accept one or
another liberal comprehensive doctrine to expect that others
endorse-not just the same liberal political conception these doctrines
support and their public political justification-but also the
123. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Evangelium Vitae §§ 2-3 (1995).
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comprehensive reasons (moral and rational autonomy, individuality,
and so on) that Kant's, Mill's, Raz's, or Dworkin's liberal doctrines
use to justify these liberal conceptions. It is perhaps not unreasonable
to expect that they will. But this does not imply, and indeed it is
wrong to say, that it is reasonable, politically speaking, to expect them
to. For, to begin with, there are many other reasonable
comprehensive doctrines justifying the same or similar liberal political
conceptions that also would not be unreasonable for reasonable
persons to accept. 24 But more to the point: To see why a reasonable
democratic citizen could not reasonably expect other citizens to
reasonably accept a doctrine of moral autonomy or Equality of
Resources when framed as a comprehensive doctrine, we should look
again to Rawls's definition of reasonable person, and the aims and
interests that guide reasonable persons' judgments from the public
standpoint of free and equal citizens. First, reasonable persons want
to cooperate with others on fair terms that other reasonable persons
can willingly accept and abide by. (Among other things, reasonable
persons do not want other reasonable people to feel unduly coerced in
complying with the basic terms of their political system.) This implies
living with others on terms that are justifiable to them. 25 Moreover,
reasonable persons appreciate and accept the consequences of the
burdens of judgment-reasonable persons inevitably will differ in
their reasonable comprehensive views. These features of reasonable
persons suggest that reasonable persons will look for terms of
cooperation that, so far as possible, do not rely on a particular
comprehensive doctrine. For if the terms of cooperation depend
exclusively on comprehensive doctrines, then people with conflicting
reasonable doctrines cannot willingly accept them (thereby
contravening the first aspect of reasonable persons). Avoiding
comprehensive doctrines is especially important given the further
purpose for which liberal political conceptions are to be used. In
addition to their role as terms of willing cooperation, a liberal
conception also is to serve as a basis of public and political justification
among reasonable citizens who endorse different and conflicting
reasonable comprehensive views. Terms of cooperation that depend
on a particular doctrine in order for their terms to be understood
simply cannot serve this role.
This is where the idea of a political justification, as justification to
persons in their capacity as free and equal citizens, becomes
important. Reasonable citizens in a democratic society normally
124. Rawls uses the concept of "not unreasonable" to denote a space between
being reasonable and unreasonable. See, e.g., Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note
19, at 184, 190; cf Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 74. Because of the
burdens of judgments, it is not unreasonable for reasonable persons to endorse one or
another reasonable comprehensive doctrines within a wide range.
125. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 49.
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regard themselves and each other in this way in their political
relations. They cannot agree on the "whole truth" or on the nature of
truth, or of reason. But the aim of a political justification is not
showing-the-truth, as it is conceived by one or another comprehensive
view. Rather, political justification addresses others in terms of their
shared political self-conception, namely, in their capacity as
reasonable and rational democratic citizens. Democratic citizens have
a rational interest in maintaining their status as free and as equals, and
in developing and exercising the reasoning and other capacities
(including the moral powers) which enable them to be cooperating
members of a democratic society. They also have a fundamental
interest in the social conditions within which they pursue their
conception of the good. To justify terms of cooperation and provide
reasons to people that they can reasonably accept in their capacity as
reasonable and rational and free and equal citizens, is to provide them
with reasons that are responsive to these fundamental interests they
share. These public reasons express political values-the measures
society and its citizens need to support, and social conditions that
need obtain, if citizens are to realize these capacities and freely pursue
their determinate conceptions of their good.126
This is how the idea of political justification, and reasonable
acceptability to people in their capacity as reasonable and rational and
free and equal citizens, differs from the idea of reasonable
acceptability that Dworkin invokes in his criticism of Rawls above. Of
course, it is still open to Dworkin to object that the constraints of
public reason prevent him from making the best arguments for his
position within the political forum (in democratic legislatures and the
courts). The best arguments for a liberal political conception are
provided, he will say, by his own liberal comprehensive doctrine and
cannot be made solely in terms of public reason. But even if the
comprehensive reasons Dworkin's account provides supply the best
argument for liberal principles from the point of view of the "whole
truth," still from the perspective of other reasonable citizens who
endorse different comprehensive doctrines (liberal Catholics,
Kantians, utilitarians, and so on) these arguments do not appear to be
the best, or even persuasive, arguments. They do not provide a
justification to them, one that they can reasonably be expected to
reasonably accept, either in their capacity as reasonable democratic
citizens, or in terms of their reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
VII. PUBLIC REASON AND THE COURTS
I conclude with some remarks on the relevance of Rawls's idea of
public reason to the courts and legal reasoning. Rawls says that public
126. For a list of some of the liberal political values that serve as the basis for
public reason, see supra note 25.
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reason is the reason of a supreme court and that a supreme court is
the "exemplar of public reason.1 27 What does he mean? He is not
saying that the Supreme Court of the United States is an exemplar of
public reason, but rather that it belongs to the office of a supreme
court, as such, to be the exemplar of public reason. Some
understandably might interpret this claim as undemocratic, in so far as
it may seem to favor courts over democratically elected legislative
bodies in interpreting the constitution. It is true that Rawls does
believe that a supreme court is "one of the institutional devices to
protect the higher law.1 28 But he does not say that a supreme court is
needed for these purposes in all constitutional democracies. It is a
contextual question to be decided on an individual basis whether a
supreme court is needed to protect constitutional essentials in a
particular democratic society. 129  But where a supreme court is
needed, it is to have final institutional authority to interpret the
constitution. Then "the political values of public reason provide the
Court's basis for interpretation. "130 "By applying public reason the
court is to prevent that [higher] law from being eroded by the
legislation of transient majorities .... "I
Does this protective role of a supreme court make the court
antidemocratic? It makes it antimajoritarian with respect to ordinary
law, but on a correct understanding democracy is not majoritarianism.
It is government by a constitution that is the product of the
constituent power of a democratic people consisting of the body of
free and equal citizens. This is, of course, an idealization of
democracy, one involving not simply majoritarian legislative
procedures, but a substantive ideal of a political constitution as the
product of the will of free and equal citizens. A supreme court, when
it acts to uphold a democratic constitution, is not being
antidemocratic. Though it may frustrate majority legislative will,
"[t]he court is not antimajoritarian with respect to higher law when its
decisions reasonably accord with the constitution itself," as the
expression of the constitutive power of a democratic people.132
Rawls's account of a constitutional democracy of course will not
satisfy proponents of majoritarianism and parliamentary democracy
for whom judicial review is, by (their) definition, antidemocratic. But
what about advocates of deliberative democracy, who also assign, if
not an exclusive role, then the leading role for elected legislative
representatives in interpreting the constitution? In saying a supreme
court is the exemplar of public reason, Rawls is not saying that a
127. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 231.
128. Id. at 233.
129. Id. at 235.
130. Id. at 234.
131. Id. at 233.
132. Id. at 234.
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democratic legislature cannot be relied upon to interpret the
constitution and express public reason too. "A supreme court is not
the only institution," he says, to give "due and continuing effect to
public reason."'33 For public reason is to govern just as much the
deliberations of legislative representatives, as well as the reason of
citizens when they vote on constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice. For Rawls there is no inconsistency between
deliberative democracy 13 4 and a constitutional democracy with judicial
review even though a deliberative democracy may be required by, or a
condition of, public reason if it is to find appropriate expression,
whereas a supreme court is not always required by public reason.
Still, what makes the supreme court the exemplar of public reason
where it exists is that, while legislative representatives and citizens
may vote their comprehensive views on non-essential questions,
"public reason is the sole reason the court exercises. It is the only
branch of government that is visibly on its face the creature of that
reason and of that reason alone."'35 As such the supreme court has a
special educative role in a democracy. Judges, as judges, should have
and express no other values than the political values of public reason
as they are understood by a political conception of justice. For Rawls,
it is the role of a constitutional court to interpret the constitution in
light of the political conception judges see as most reasonable,
consistent with precedent and a written constitution. 36
Now, contrast Rawls's account with Cass Sunstein's account of the
role of the courts in judicial review.' Sunstein's idea of Incompletely
Theorized Agreements on principles is sometimes compared with
Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus and public reason. For
Sunstein, what makes constitutions possible in a democratic society is
that people with different philosophical and religious views, who
cannot agree on abstract matters of religion and basic moral principle,
nonetheless can reach agreement on "mid-level" constitutional
principles, and even more, agreement on the outcomes of particular
cases and the "low-level" legal rules and principles that account for
them. The justifications for these agreements are, and moreover must
remain, "incompletely theorized" since no appeal is made by
constitution makers, or by courts that interpret them, to an abstract
Herculean theory to justify these agreements. There is no such
theory, Sunstein contends, that all reasonable members of a
democratic society could agree to. Instead, appeal is made by courts to
such legal means of interpretation as stare decisis in order to explain
and justify agreements on outcomes and lesser legal principles, and
133. Id. at 235 & n.22.
134. See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 579.
135. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at 235.
136. Cf. id. at 236-37.
137. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 35-61 (1996).
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these modest methods of interpretation are normally sufficient for
these purposes. It is not the role of the courts, particularly in a
democracy, to appeal to abstract legal and political theories to justify
their decisions. Not only are judges generally not competent when it
comes to the abstract philosophical and moral reasoning such theories
require, but more importantly, Sunstein says, political theories do not
have democratic approval by the people. People accept lower and
mid-level legal and constitutional principles for all sorts of different
reasons that issue from their religious and moral views.
There are certain similarities between Sunstein's and Rawls's
accounts: Both accept the impossibility of agreement on
comprehensive doctrines and emphasize the possibility of agreement
on "mid-level constitutional principles" among people with different
values and comprehensive views. But as Sunstein himself notes, what
he is doing is quite different from Rawls.138 Sunstein is trying to find a
way to forge and justify agreements on legal outcomes and on lower
and middle-level legal principles without appealing to more general
political and moral principles of theories. Rawls, by contrast, aims to
provide just the abstract principles and theory-the political
conception of justice-that Sunstein rejects. Rawls claims that a
political conception is required as an integral part of public reason, for
without political conceptions of justice, public justifications cannot be
complete, or even provided at all in some cases.
One problem with Sunstein's view is that it offers what may well be
an illusory solution, for what informs reasoning by analogy that
constitutes stare decisis is a commitment to moral and political
principles. The reason that people can agree on an outcome that is
reached by relying on precedent is that they implicitly endorse
political principles that allow them to judge that one line of cases
rather than another functions as an appropriate precedent for the
current case. Without agreement on principles there is no agreement
on the judgment that some alleged precedent is similar enough to
serve as a basis of decision for the present case. This does not mean,
of course, that we know or even need to know what this principle is.
Nor does it even mean that people implicitly rely on the same
principles. Often, because of our implicit reliance on similar
principles and other factors, judges' judgments about the adequacy of
precedent to decide a case suffices for a legal justification. Where the
problem arises is when there is disagreement about the relevance or
sufficient similarity of alleged precedents. That is one of several
points when there is a need to appeal to more abstract principles.
Another would be when relying on clear precedent works an injustice
to someone. And Sunstein does not seem to deny this. He says,
"[s]ome cases cannot be decided at all without introducing a fair
138. Id. at 46-47.
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amount in the way of theory. Moreover, some cases cannot be
decided well without introducing theory." '139
So seemingly it is not that Sunstein rejects reliance on political
conceptions of justice in public political argument by political officials.
In the end, Sunstein's argument really is only against judicial appeal to
abstract principle (unless, it seems, it is absolutely necessary). His
argument for judicial restraint in interpretation is mainly based in his
affirmation of deliberative democracy, and ultimately of a view about
justice. Judges lack "democratic pedigree," he says.
The American system is a deliberative democracy in which the
system of electoral politics is combined with an aspiration to
political reason-giving. The real forum of principle in American
government has been democratic rather than adjudicative; consider
the founding, the Civil War, the New Deal, and others-
progressivism, the civil rights movement, the women's
movement .... [F]undamental principles are best developed
politically rather than judicially. 4°
Set aside the question of whether this is an overly idealized
understanding of American democracy and its legislatures and the
alternative view that they resemble interest-based majoritarianism
more than deliberative democracy, or the question of whether the
American political system (given the "curse of money" and corporate
influence in our politics) is rightly called "democratic" at all. 41 We
can agree with Sunstein's aspirations, and still assign to the courts a
significant role in expressing the democratic principles that the People
have developed, legislatively and constitutionally. There is more to
deliberative democracy on anyone's account than simply legislative
rule by officials elected subject to equal political rights and majority
rule. As many advocates, including Rawls, have argued, a deliberative
democracy has its preconditions, including an understanding of equal
basic liberties and their priority, and a provision of a social minimum
of the kind that Rawls sees as a precondition for public reasoning.
What makes a democracy deliberative for Rawls is that it is governed
by public reason. This is the "ideal of public reason." But ideals are
often not followed. Who is to attend to the preconditions of
deliberative democracy and the public reason that informs it when
elected representatives themselves undermine them? Who is to be
the voice of public reason when the legislative branch refuses, perhaps
because it is guided by the influences of wealth and other particular
interests? The courts can be an essential ingredient of a deliberative
democracy in a nation such as ours, with a federal system and widely
diverse population that constantly generates democratic conflicts in
139. Id. at 54. Therefore, "[j]udges should adopt a presumption rather than a
taboo against high-level theorization." Id. at 57.
140. Id. at 60.
141. Cf Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 580-81.
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understandings of the Constitution and the laws. Moreover, to say a
supreme court is the exemplar of public reason is not to deny that
elected representatives are not also to be governed by public reasons
in their deliberations and have a duty to justify laws in terms of them.
But legislators are not always prepared to give voice to public reason.
Of course, as Jeremy Waldron rightly argues, courts are not
disinterested purveyors of public reason either. They can be just as
partisan as legislatures, with far more damaging consequences, since
their decisions can be democratically overturned only by
constitutional amendment. 4 2 The history of the Supreme Court of the
United States sometimes confirms Waldron's point, but the Court has
not always acted in such a partisan manner, and for much of the past
seventy years it has acted compatibly with democratic justice and
according to public reason. Whether this is sufficient to justify the
institution in our history is a question better addressed by
constitutional theorists and legal historians. But that there is a
legitimate question at all belies Waldron's position, which is that
judicial review is never justified in a democracy. If we see democratic
lawmaking as justified when it serves democratic justice and do not
identify the two as being one and the same, then I do not see how the
argument can be sustained that judicial review is never justified in a
democracy.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE FEASIBILITY OF A WELL-ORDERED
SOCIETY OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
It is often said that with political liberalism Rawls increasingly
departed from the two principles of justice and the more egalitarian
features of his view, that he came to doubt the difference principle,
that he became more conservative. I do not believe any of these
claims are true. I want to suggest a different understanding of what is
going on in political liberalism: Rather than being a rejection of justice
as fairness and its egalitarian aspects, political liberalism, and
particularly The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, is Rawls's final
affirmation of justice as fairness. As Rawls states, political liberalism
grew out of his concerns with the arguments for stability in A Theory
of Justice. Because the congruence argument depended on everyone's
adopting the same comprehensive doctrine in a well-ordered society
of justice as fairness, the argument for stability of that conception
relied upon an unrealistic assumption about people's philosophical,
religious and ethical views.143 Justice as fairness allows for the very
conditions that encourage reasonable people to have different and
142. See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 255-81 (1999).
143. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 8, at xix, 388 & n.21. On the
congruence argument and its problems, see Samuel Freeman, Congruence and the




conflicting comprehensive views, all of which are reasonable. The
question then becomes: How can it realistically be assumed that
justice as fairness might be generally accepted and endorsed and
remain stable in a well-ordered society, where that conception of
justice specifies the terms of social cooperation? Rawls's reply in
political liberalism is: The conditions under which justice as fairness
might specify a realistic conception of social cooperation that is
generally endorsed by all reasonable people, who now have not only
different and conflicting conceptions of their good but who also
endorse different comprehensive doctrines, is a society in which
justice as fairness (1) is conceived by citizens as a freestanding
political conception of justice implicit in democratic values and
culture, (2) which is affirmed by all reasonable comprehensive
doctrines in an overlapping consensus, and (3) where the exercise of
political power is recognized by all as legitimate since this
freestanding political conception is regularly appealed to in order to
specify political values and provide the content of public reason.
Conceived in this way-as a realistic account of the conditions
under which justice as fairness might provide a stable basis for a well-
ordered society-there is no dilution of the egalitarian elements of
justice as fairness by political liberalism. Moreover, according to A
Theory of Justice, justice as fairness is not only the most just liberal
conception but, according to Political Liberalism, it is also the most
legitimate political conception, or rather, it is the political conception
that is most capable of providing legitimacy to the exercise of political
power. What happens, however, once Rawls accepts (as he did in his
last works on the subject) not only the fact of reasonable pluralism
and reasonable disagreement in comprehensive doctrines, but
inevitable disagreements among reasonable democratic citizens about
justice itself, even among the members of a well-ordered liberal
society? This is implicit in his claim that the forms of public reason
are several and that a family of liberal political conceptions provides
the content of public reason. The implications of this conclusion may
be more far-reaching for assessing Rawls's work than is his adoption
of political liberalism. For what it may mean is that Rawls gave up on
an idea which moved him from early on and which underlay his
contractarianism. This is the idea of a well-ordered society, defined as
a society in which everyone publicly accepts the same conception of
justice, and where this conception provides the basis for laws and
political policies as well as public justification and agreement. The
idea of a well-ordered society is significant for Rawls for several
reasons. It is a society in which everyone can be seen as genuinely
free and as legislators of the laws, since everyone freely accepts the
basic justification for laws and the procedures which lead to them,
compatibly with the conception of citizens as free and equal,
reasonable and rational. Because the constitution and the laws issue
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from a conception of justice that is constructed on the basis of citizens'
conception of themselves as free and equal moral persons, a well-
ordered society is to this degree a society in which all citizens can be
said to be politically autonomous, and (if they endorse a liberal
comprehensive doctrine) morally and rationally autonomous as well.
In conceding that even under the best of conditions, where justice
as fairness itself is in effect, there will be a pluralism, not just of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but of liberal political
conceptions of justice, Rawls appears to concede that a well-ordered
society of justice as fairness is not feasible, at least not as originally
conceived. For a well-ordered society is defined as one where
everyone publicly acknowledges and is motivated by the same
conception of justice. But because of the burdens of judgment, this
ideal is not practicable and is, by Rawls's own lights, unrealistic. The
most that we can expect is a society where there is general acceptance
by all reasonable people of one or another liberal and democratic
political view (justice as fairness being among them).1" For Rawls,
this must have been a difficult concession to have had to make. It
means that the contractarian ideal of a society in which all reasonable
and rational persons agree on the most reasonable principles of justice
is beyond human capabilities. A just society in the fullest sense for
Rawls-a well-ordered society conforming to justice as fairness that is
stable for the right reasons-is not after all entirely possible. We can
take consolation in the fact that something near-justice-a liberal
society that satisfies the requirements of public reason-still is.'45
144. Cf Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 14, at 614-15.
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